State v. Economo
76 Ohio St. 3d 56, 666 N.E.2d 225 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
The statutory corroboration requirement for a sexual imposition conviction under Ohio law is satisfied by slight circumstances or evidence that tends to support the victim's testimony and connect the accused with the crime; it does not require evidence that is independently sufficient to convict or that proves every essential element of the offense.
Facts:
- Dr. Economo and Ms. Doman had an established physician-patient relationship.
- Doman alleged that Economo engaged in unwanted sexual contact with her during appointments on July 3 and July 6, 1992.
- On July 10, 1992, Doman returned to Economo's office accompanied by her friend, Ms. Watt.
- Upon arriving at the office, Doman was visibly scared and upset.
- Doman asked Watt to accompany her into the examination room specifically so that Economo would refrain from touching her.
- After Doman left the examination room on July 10, Watt observed that she was on the verge of crying.
Procedural Posture:
- Economo was charged and convicted of sexual imposition in the trial court.
- Economo appealed his conviction to the intermediate court of appeals.
- The court of appeals, as the appellant's court, reversed Economo's conviction, finding the corroborating evidence legally insufficient.
- The State of Ohio (appellant) then appealed the reversal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, with Economo as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does the corroboration requirement for sexual imposition under R.C. 2907.06(B) require that the 'other evidence' independently prove an essential element of the crime, or is it satisfied by evidence that merely tends to support the victim’s testimony?
Opinions:
Majority - Cook, J.
No. The corroboration requirement under R.C. 2907.06(B) does not require that 'other evidence' independently prove an essential element of the crime; it is satisfied by evidence that tends to support the victim's testimony. The court reasoned that the purpose of the statute is to prevent a conviction based solely on unsupported testimony, not to require independent proof of the crime. Citing precedents regarding accomplice testimony and similar statutes in other states, the court held that 'slight circumstances' are sufficient. In this case, medical records established opportunity, and a friend's testimony about the victim's fear and request for a chaperone tended to support the victim’s account. This evidence crossed the low threshold of legal sufficiency, leaving the ultimate determination of guilt to the factfinder.
Dissenting - Painter, J.
Yes. The 'other evidence' must connect the defendant with the crime itself, not just place them in a normal setting with the victim. The majority's interpretation effectively construes the corroboration requirement out of existence by setting the bar for sufficiency too low. This approach violates the principle that criminal statutes should be strictly construed against the state. The evidence presented—that a patient saw her doctor at his office—is entirely innocuous and does not corroborate the commission of a crime in any meaningful way. By accepting such evidence as legally sufficient, the majority engages in 'judicial fiat' and nullifies the legislature's mandate.
Concurring - Resnick, J.
No. The corroboration requirement is met by any evidence, no matter how slight, which supports the victim's testimony and makes it more reasonable to believe. This concurrence was written to highlight the inconsistent standards applied by lower courts and to endorse the majority's clear, low-threshold standard. However, the author strongly advocates for the legislative repeal of the corroboration requirement altogether, arguing it is an archaic rule based on outdated and unsubstantiated views about the credibility of sexual offense victims. The existing safeguards within the criminal justice system are sufficient to protect defendants from wrongful convictions.
Analysis:
This decision significantly lowers the evidentiary bar for satisfying Ohio's statutory corroboration requirement in sexual imposition cases. By rejecting a stricter standard that required proof of the crime's core elements, the court makes it easier for prosecutors to bring such cases to a jury. The ruling clarifies a point of division among lower courts and establishes a minimal 'slight circumstances' threshold. While upholding the statute, the majority and concurring opinions heavily criticize the requirement as an archaic legislative product of 'waning attitudes' toward sex crime victims, strongly signaling to the legislature that the rule should be abolished.
