State v. Donohue
834 A.2d 253, 2003 N.H. LEXIS 158, 150 N.H. 180 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
A person cannot be convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime where an element of the underlying offense is a result caused by a reckless mental state, as it is a legal impossibility to purposefully agree to bring about an unintentional result.
Facts:
- Jason Lonergan and Christopher Burke encountered Robert Donohue's girlfriend crying outside a bar and asked if she was okay.
- An argument escalated between Donohue and Lonergan.
- After the argument, Donohue told Lonergan he was going inside to get his brother.
- Donohue found his half-brother, Joe Gardner, inside the bar and told him he had argued with some men who he thought wanted to fight.
- Sometime later, Donohue and Gardner encountered Lonergan and Burke in a parking lot.
- After one of the brothers yelled "hey," Donohue punched Lonergan and Gardner punched Burke.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Donohue was charged in Superior Court with one count of reckless second-degree assault and one count of conspiracy to commit second-degree assault.
- Donohue filed a motion to dismiss the conspiracy indictment, arguing it was a legally impossible crime, but the trial court denied the motion.
- Following a trial, a jury convicted Donohue on both counts.
- Donohue, as the appellant, appealed only the conspiracy conviction to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, with the State as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does New Hampshire law permit a conviction for conspiracy to commit reckless second-degree assault?
Opinions:
Majority - Nadeau, J.
No. A conviction for conspiracy to commit reckless second-degree assault is not permitted under New Hampshire law. The court reasoned that the crime of conspiracy requires a purposeful mental state; the defendant must have the specific purpose to bring about the commission of the crime. In contrast, reckless second-degree assault is a result-oriented crime that requires only a reckless mental state—consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing serious bodily injury. The court found a logical contradiction in a person having the specific 'purpose' to achieve a result that is, by definition, 'reckless' and unintentional. Adopting the reasoning of the Model Penal Code, the court held that one cannot agree in advance to recklessly cause a particular harm. The court distinguished this from accomplice liability, where one can be liable for purposefully aiding another's reckless conduct, because conspiracy is a distinct inchoate crime focused on the agreement itself.
Analysis:
This decision aligns New Hampshire criminal law with the Model Penal Code and the majority of U.S. jurisdictions by clarifying that conspiracy is a specific intent crime. It establishes that the mental state for conspiracy (purpose) cannot be logically reconciled with an underlying offense where the culpability for a result element is based on recklessness. This holding prevents prosecutors from bringing charges for conspiracy to commit result-based crimes of recklessness or negligence, thereby reinforcing the distinction between inchoate liability (conspiracy) and accessorial liability (accomplice). The case solidifies the principle that a criminal agreement must be aimed at an intentional outcome.
