State v. Donald
844 P.2d 447, 68 Wash. App. 543, 1993 Wash. App. LEXIS 38 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
A conviction for attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud or false name does not require proof that the physician relied upon the false name, and intent to deceive can be permissibly inferred from the use of a false name combined with other evidence of deceptive conduct.
Facts:
- On September 12, 1990, Terry Edward Donald came to the emergency room of Cascade Medical Center in Leavenworth, identifying himself as Duke Adams.
- Dr. Stephen Hufnan, the attending physician, recognized Mr. Donald from a prior emergency room visit and knew from medical records that Mr. Donald had visited on a third occasion, each time using a different name and obtaining narcotics.
- Mr. Donald told Dr. Hufnan he needed pain medication for travel to the East Coast for cancer therapy, but Dr. Hufnan was unable to confirm the cancer claim.
- Dr. Hufnan suggested non-narcotic anti-inflammatories and 'lesser abuse-potential narcotic medications,' but Mr. Donald objected to both and specifically requested Percocet.
- Dr. Hufnan then asked a nurse to call the sheriff.
- Mr. Donald testified he used a false name because he owed the medical center money from earlier treatments and denied asking for Percocet.
Procedural Posture:
- Terry Edward Donald was charged by amended information in a Washington trial court with attempting to obtain a controlled substance through fraud or by use of a false name, in violation of RCW 69.50.403(a)(3).
- Defense counsel filed pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress Mr. Donald's statements to a sheriff's deputy, a motion in limine to exclude testimony about his previous hospital visits, and a motion to limit the admission of his prior arrests.
- The trial court granted the motion to suppress statements and the motion to exclude evidence of prior arrests.
- The trial court denied the motion in limine to disallow evidence of Mr. Donald's prior hospital visits.
- The jury found Mr. Donald guilty of the charge.
- Mr. Donald appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals of Washington.
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Issue:
Is the evidence sufficient to support a conviction for attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud or false name, and is physician reliance on the false name a necessary element of the offense?
Opinions:
Majority - Thompson, J.
Yes, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud or false name, and physician reliance on the false name is not a necessary element of the offense. The court affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence to support both alternative means of committing the offense: using a false name and fraud/deceit/misrepresentation/subterfuge. Citing State v. Lee, the court reiterated that physician reliance is not an element of RCW 69.50.403(a)(3), as the statute's purpose is to prevent individuals from obtaining an oversupply of narcotics using different names, regardless of the legitimacy of their initial complaint. As for intent to deceive, the court reasoned that while the use of a false name does not compel an inference of guilty knowledge, it permits such an inference. When viewed in conjunction with Dr. Hufnan's testimony (Mr. Donald's prior history of using different names to obtain narcotics, his unconfirmed cancer claim, rejection of alternative medications, and specific request for Percocet), the jury could rationally infer an intent to deceive. The court also held that evidence of Mr. Donald's prior visits and use of different names was properly admitted under ER 404(b) as it was relevant and probative to show the falsity of the name, guilty knowledge, intent, and fraud. Lastly, the court found no ineffective assistance of counsel, applying the Strickland v. Washington standard, concluding that counsel's performance was not deficient and any omissions, such as not requesting a limiting instruction, could be presumed a trial tactic.
Analysis:
This case clarifies a significant aspect of Washington's controlled substance laws, specifically that proof of a physician's reliance on a false name is not required for a conviction under RCW 69.50.403(a)(3). It broadens the scope of prosecutorial success in drug fraud cases by allowing intent to be inferred from a combination of deceptive acts, including the use of a false name and specific drug requests. The decision also reinforces the application of ER 404(b) for admitting prior bad acts to establish intent and knowledge in fraud-related offenses, and provides further guidance on the high threshold for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel.
