State v. Diaz
679 A.2d 902, 1996 Conn. LEXIS 234, 237 Conn. 518 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
A conspirator may be held vicariously liable for criminal offenses committed by a coconspirator if those offenses are committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and are a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the unlawful agreement, even if the defendant was not a leader of the conspiracy.
Facts:
- On the evening of June 26, 1991, Hector Gonzalez and Valerie Falcon were driving their Ford Bronco with their two young children inside.
- They followed a relative, Fitzgerald Guisti, to the corner of Hallett and Jane Streets in Bridgeport to buy marijuana.
- A group of men, including Raul Ivan Diaz, were gathered on the corner.
- After the Bronco passed, one of the men, Gerald Torres, yelled, "that’s the truck, let’s do the truck."
- Diaz and several other men retrieved guns from a nearby car, hid behind parked vehicles, and awaited the Bronco's return.
- When the Bronco drove back down the street, Diaz and his associates ran out and fired approximately 35-40 shots at the vehicle.
- Despite Fitzgerald Guisti yelling that there was a child in the vehicle, the shooting continued.
- A 9-millimeter bullet struck and killed eight-year-old William Guisti, Jr., who was a passenger in the Bronco.
Procedural Posture:
- The state charged Raul Ivan Diaz with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, two counts of attempted murder, and carrying a pistol without a permit.
- The case was tried before a jury in a Connecticut trial court.
- The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.
- The trial court entered a judgment of conviction against Diaz.
- Diaz, as the appellant, appealed the judgment directly to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does the Pinkerton doctrine, which holds a conspirator vicariously liable for reasonably foreseeable crimes committed by a coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, apply under Connecticut state law even when the defendant is not the leader of the conspiracy?
Opinions:
Majority - Palmer, J.
Yes. The Pinkerton doctrine of vicarious liability for coconspirators applies under Connecticut law even if the defendant is not a leader, so long as its application is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. The court extended its prior holding in State v. Walton, which had applied the doctrine where the defendant was a leader. The rationale for this extension is that a conspiracy is a 'partnership in crime,' and a conspirator who plays a necessary part in setting criminal conduct in motion should be held responsible for the natural and probable results of that conduct. The court cautioned that liability should not be imposed where the connection between the defendant's role and the coconspirator's crime is too attenuated or remote. In this case, however, Diaz was a 'fully engaged member' who actively participated in the ambush, making it fair to hold him vicariously liable for the murder committed by a coconspirator, as it was foreseeable, integral to the conspiracy's objective, and in furtherance of it.
Concurring - Berdon, J.
Justice Berdon concurred with the judgment but wrote separately to express his continued disagreement with the adoption of the Pinkerton doctrine in Connecticut, which he had detailed in his dissent in State v. Walton. However, under the principle of stare decisis, he accepted Pinkerton liability as the established law of the state and therefore agreed with the majority's conclusion in this specific case.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadened the application of vicarious criminal liability in Connecticut by formally adopting the full scope of the federal Pinkerton doctrine. By removing the limitations suggested in State v. Walton (e.g., that the defendant be a leader of the conspiracy), the court made it easier for prosecutors to convict any member of a conspiracy for substantive crimes committed by fellow conspirators. The ruling establishes a 'fair and reasonable' standard as a safeguard against overreach but ultimately lowers the threshold for holding all participants in a criminal agreement accountable for foreseeable acts, regardless of their specific role in the ultimate crime.
