State v. Desoto
968 So.2d 146, 2007 WL 2317116 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
Criminal negligence requires proof of a gross deviation from the standard of care expected of a reasonably careful person under like circumstances, and this standard is not met when a hunter, after being alerted to a deer's presence, shoots at what he subjectively and consistently claims to believe is a deer, absent contradictory evidence.
Facts:
- On November 20, 2004, Jake DeSoto and Kain Roy went hunting together in the afternoon.
- The two men separated, with Roy heading to a deer stand known as the 'Eiffel Tower' and DeSoto going to another location in a field.
- At approximately 5:19 p.m., Roy called DeSoto on his cell phone to inform him that he saw a deer near a slough and told DeSoto to stay where he was.
- Around 5:30 p.m., near sunset in dreary, overcast, and possibly foggy weather, DeSoto fired his rifle from about 246 feet away at what he believed was a deer.
- The shot struck and killed Roy, who was found lying in the slough.
- At the time of his death, Roy was wearing a camouflage jacket over a gray shirt and was not wearing any hunter's orange safety clothing.
- A medical expert testified that the shot was fired parallel to the ground and that Roy's neck was parallel to the ground when he was struck.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Louisiana charged Jake C. Desoto by bill of indictment with negligent homicide.
- Desoto entered a plea of not guilty and the case was tried before a jury in the state trial court.
- On February 2, 2006, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
- The trial court denied Desoto's Motion for Post Verdict Judgment of Acquittal and sentenced him to five years imprisonment, with two years suspended.
- Desoto, as appellant, appealed his conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
- An initial panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, with one judge dissenting.
- The Court of Appeal then granted the appellant's request for a rehearing to reconsider its decision.
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Issue:
Does the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, support a conviction for negligent homicide by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care expected of a reasonable hunter?
Opinions:
Majority - Thibodeaux, C.J.
No. The evidence adduced at trial does not support a finding of criminal negligence. The central issue is whether the defendant believed he shot at a deer. Citing State in the Interest of S.T., the court found that where a hunter shoots what he believes to be a deer, there is no evidence of criminal negligence. The defendant's statements that Roy had alerted him to a deer in the area and that he shot at what he thought was a deer were uncontradicted by any testimony. This case is distinguishable from State v. Parker, where the defendant intentionally shot through a door at a person. Even if the defendant's conduct was negligent, it did not amount to a 'gross deviation' below the standard of care, as there was no evidence that he knew Roy had left the safety of the deer stand.
Concurring - Cooks, J.
No. The State failed to prove the essential elements of criminal negligence beyond a reasonable doubt. The decedent was not wearing any identifiable 'hunting orange' clothing, and there was no evidence of alcohol consumption or horseplay. The State's primary evidence, that the defendant was on his cell phone with his girlfriend shortly before the shot, is insufficient to establish a gross deviation from the standard of care. The violation of a hunting safety rule, such as being absolutely certain of one's target, does not automatically constitute criminal negligence, otherwise every hunting accident would be a de facto crime. There was no evidence to indicate the defendant believed or had reason to believe that his friend was the target.
Dissenting - Pickett, J.
Yes. The majority improperly substituted its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the jury, which is the finder of fact. The proper standard of review is from Jackson v. Virginia, which requires the court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine if any rational trier of fact could have found guilt. The jury could have concluded from the defendant's own statements that he actually saw Roy enter the field before shooting, or that he shot without clearly identifying his target. Either conclusion, under the circumstances, would support a finding that his conduct was a gross deviation below the standard of care of a reasonably careful person.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the high evidentiary threshold for criminal negligence in the context of tragic hunting accidents in Louisiana. By focusing on the defendant's uncontradicted subjective belief, the court makes it difficult for the state to secure a conviction without direct evidence of more egregious behavior, such as intoxication, horseplay, or clear knowledge of the victim's presence. The ruling reinforces the critical distinction between ordinary negligence, which is a basis for a civil lawsuit, and the 'gross deviation' from the standard of care required for criminal culpability under the negligent homicide statute. This precedent narrows the statute's application in accidental shooting cases and provides a strong defense where the hunter's claim of mistake is plausible and unrefuted.
