State v. DeLao
252 Wis. 2d 289, 2002 WI 49, 643 N.W.2d 480 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
A prosecutor's obligation under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(l)(b) to disclose a defendant's oral statements that the State "plans to use in the course of the trial" is governed by an objective standard of due diligence, imputing knowledge from key investigative agencies to the prosecutor; failure to disclose without good cause, especially when it prejudices the defendant's trial strategy, warrants a new trial.
Facts:
- On May 31, 1999, a grocery store was robbed, and Desmond Stalsberg was a suspect.
- One week later, on June 7, 1999, Stalsberg and John Sabala got into a fight at Media DeLao's house, during which Stalsberg fired shots at Sabala.
- On the same day, Investigator Doug Chaussee of the Mount Pleasant Police Department interviewed DeLao; she initially denied involvement but later admitted being present and helping Stalsberg clean the crime scene, stating she was afraid and Stalsberg was "acting crazy."
- Sometime after Chaussee's initial interview, he told Detective James Prioletta that DeLao might have information about the robbery.
- On June 28, 1999, Detective James Prioletta of the City of Racine Police Department interviewed DeLao while she was in custody, focusing on the robbery investigation, and took notes on her oral statements which indicated she was not afraid of Stalsberg.
- On Sunday, July 25, 1999 (two days before trial), Investigator Chaussee spoke with Detective Prioletta, who informed Chaussee of DeLao's statements (that she was not afraid of Stalsberg).
- During DeLao's opening statement at her trial, her attorney told the jury that DeLao acted out of fear of Stalsberg and lied to police due to this fear, framing her defense as "survival."
Procedural Posture:
- The State filed a criminal complaint against Media DeLao, alleging obstruction of an officer and harboring or aiding a felon, related to her actions after the shooting.
- Prior to trial, DeLao filed a discovery demand requesting summaries of her oral statements pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.23(l)(b).
- DeLao's trial began on Tuesday, July 27, 1999, in the circuit court.
- After the State rested its case-in-chief on the second day of trial, the prosecutor informed the circuit court of DeLao's statements to Detective Prioletta, indicating intent to use them for impeachment.
- DeLao objected to the admission of these statements, citing a discovery violation, and moved for a mistrial.
- The circuit court overruled DeLao's objection and denied her motion for mistrial, allowing the State to cross-examine DeLao using the statements and to call Detective Prioletta as a rebuttal witness.
- The jury found DeLao guilty of obstruction of an officer, harboring or aiding a felon, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun.
- DeLao appealed her conviction to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals (appellant DeLao, appellee State).
- The Court of Appeals reversed DeLao's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding the State violated its discovery obligations without good cause, and DeLao was prejudiced.
- The State of Wisconsin petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for review (appellant State, appellee DeLao).
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Issue:
Does the State violate its discovery obligations under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(l)(b) when it fails to disclose a defendant's oral statements before trial, even if the prosecutor was not personally aware of them, and should such a violation, without good cause, require a new trial if prejudicial?
Opinions:
Majority - Ann Walsh Bradley, J.
Yes, the State violated its discovery obligations under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(l)(b), did not show good cause for the violation, and DeLao was prejudiced by the admission of her statements, entitling her to a new trial. The court reaffirmed that a prosecutor's discovery obligations extend to information in the possession of law enforcement agencies involved in the investigation, even if the prosecutor is not personally aware of it, based on the "due diligence" and "imputed knowledge" principles from Wold v. State and Jones v. State. This means knowledge held by Investigator Chaussee, a key actor in DeLao's case, is imputed to the prosecutor. The phrase "plans to use in the course of the trial" in the statute necessarily embodies an objective standard—what a reasonable prosecutor, exercising due diligence, should have known and would have planned to use under the circumstances. A subjective standard would permit prosecutorial "sandbagging" and discovery abuse. The court found that the two investigations (robbery and shooting) were "hopelessly intertwined" and DeLao's defense of acting out of fear was apparent from the outset, making her statements about not being afraid clearly relevant. The State failed to demonstrate good cause for its non-disclosure, as good faith alone is insufficient without additional explanation, which was not provided. The late disclosure placed DeLao in a prejudicial dilemma: either retract her attorney's opening statement promise to testify about fear or testify and face impeachment with previously undisclosed, highly relevant contradictory statements, thereby undermining her entire trial strategy and frustrating the purposes of discovery. Therefore, the admission of the statements was prejudicial and a new trial is required.
Dissenting - David T. Prosser, J.
No, the majority's decision unreasonably enlarges prosecutorial discovery obligations, misinterprets the statute's "plans to use" standard, and misapplies the harmless error rule, thus leading to an unworkable and mistaken revision of discovery law. The dissent argued that the prosecutor was not required by "due diligence" to seek information from the Racine Police Department (Detective Prioletta) because that agency did not investigate or evaluate the Mount Pleasant case against DeLao, and the two investigations were not "hopelessly intertwined." The statutory phrase "plans to use" and similar phrases like "intends to use" or "intends to call" in other subsections of § 971.23(1) should embody a subjective standard, reflecting the prosecutor's actual intent. The majority's objective standard for this phrase is a judicial rewrite of the statute that contradicts precedent like State v. Larsen. The State did show good cause for the delayed disclosure; the prosecutor acted in good faith, disclosing the information as soon as she personally learned of its relevance, and Investigator Chaussee disclosed it once he recognized its significance. DeLao's "coercion" defense was not clearly apparent to the State before opening statements, as found by the trial judge. Furthermore, the information was used solely for impeachment and rebuttal, for which there is a statutory exception for witnesses. Even if there was a discovery violation, the error was harmless because the jury's discerning verdicts (acquitting DeLao on some charges) inspire confidence in the outcome, and DeLao had procedural options, including not testifying or seeking a continuance, after the mid-trial disclosure.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarified the scope of prosecutorial discovery obligations under Wisconsin law, particularly regarding oral statements of the defendant. It established an objective "due diligence" standard for determining what a prosecutor "plans to use," preventing prosecutors from claiming ignorance to avoid disclosure and aiming to ensure fairer trials by giving defendants ample opportunity to prepare. The decision also underscored that good faith alone is insufficient for "good cause" in discovery violations, requiring a more concrete explanation to justify non-disclosure. This ruling has broad implications for how prosecutors must manage information sharing between their offices and various law enforcement agencies, emphasizing proactive rather than reactive disclosure to maintain trial integrity.
