State v. Dejarlais
136 Wash. 2d 939, 969 P.2d 90, 1998 Wash. LEXIS 944 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
The consent of a person protected by a domestic violence protection order is not a valid legal defense to a charge of violating that order. The sole responsibility for adhering to the order's prohibitions rests with the person being restrained.
Facts:
- Kimberly Shupe and Steven Dejarlais began a relationship in 1993 while Shupe was divorcing her husband.
- At her husband's request and to avoid issues with their temporary parenting plan, Shupe petitioned for an order for protection against Dejarlais, claiming he was harassing her.
- On September 23, 1993, a court issued a one-year Order for Protection restraining Dejarlais from contacting Shupe or coming within 100 feet of her residence.
- Dejarlais was officially served with the order on November 23, 1993.
- Despite the order, Shupe and Dejarlais continued their relationship.
- On May 22, 1994, after a stay in jail on an unrelated matter, Dejarlais went to Shupe's home and entered through an unlocked door.
- Shupe confronted Dejarlais about seeing another woman but did not ask him to leave, fearing he would become angry.
- Dejarlais then followed Shupe to her bedroom and engaged in nonconsensual sexual intercourse with her twice.
Procedural Posture:
- Steven Dejarlais was charged in Pierce County Superior Court (a trial court) with one count of violating a protection order and one count of rape.
- At trial, the court refused the defense's request to instruct the jury that consent from the protected person is a valid defense to violating the order.
- The jury convicted Dejarlais of violation of a protection order and rape in the third degree.
- Dejarlais, as the appellant, appealed his convictions to the Washington Court of Appeals (an intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- Dejarlais, as the petitioner, petitioned for review by the Supreme Court of Washington (the state's highest court), which granted the petition.
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Issue:
Is the consent of the person protected by a domestic violence protection order a valid legal defense for the restrained person charged with violating that order?
Opinions:
Majority - Dolliver, J.
No. The consent of the person protected by a domestic violence protection order is not a valid legal defense for the restrained person charged with violating that order. The court reasoned that the statute governing protection orders, RCW 26.50, does not provide for a consent defense. The legislature clearly intended for these orders to address domestic violence as a public problem, not merely a private dispute that the protected party can waive. Allowing consent as a defense would constitute a de facto modification of a court order, which can only be formally changed by a court after a hearing. The statutory scheme, including mandatory arrest provisions and explicit warnings on order forms (in later versions), places the sole responsibility on the restrained person to avoid any violation, regardless of an invitation or acquiescence from the protected party.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies that a protection order is a direct command from the court, not a private agreement that the parties can informally alter or waive. It places the entire legal burden of compliance squarely on the restrained person, removing a common defense tactic and clarifying that the protected person's actions cannot absolve the restrained person of liability. This strengthens the enforcement power of protection orders, reinforcing the state's significant public interest in preventing domestic violence and ensuring that only a court can modify its own orders.
