State v. Davis
2011 Ore. LEXIS 712, 351 Or. 35, 261 P.3d 1197 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
Under OEC 701, lay opinion testimony is admissible if rationally based on the witness's perception from personal knowledge and helpful to a fact in issue, even if not medically certain. Evidence of prior acts is admissible under OEC 703 and 705 to explain an expert's opinion, not to prove character. However, out-of-court statements are not relevant simply to show a listener's belief without a medical basis or if subsequent medical diagnoses negate the inference. An evidentiary error is reversible unless there is little likelihood it affected the jury's verdict, as per Article VII (Amended), section 3 of the Oregon Constitution.
Facts:
- Terry Dean Davis's 15-month-old daughter (the victim) died on June 30, 2002.
- The victim lived with her mother, Ecklund, and other children; Ecklund and Davis lived apart, and the victim stayed with Davis overnight sometimes.
- In mid-June 2002, the victim fell off a motel bed during a family vacation but showed no signs of distress.
- On June 25, Ecklund noticed the victim was unwell (vomiting, glassy eyes) and asked her friend Payne, a registered nurse, to examine the victim; Payne noted the victim was unresponsive and believed the victim resembled her own daughter who had suffered a traumatic brain injury.
- Ecklund took the victim to Santiam Hospital, where she was evaluated, treated for dehydration and a viral infection, and her symptoms resolved.
- On June 29, around 7:00 p.m., Davis picked up the victim for an overnight visit; she was fussing but showed no other illness or injury.
- Later that evening, after 10:00 p.m., the victim ate pineapple, then spat up/vomited, became limp and unresponsive; Davis called Ecklund, who then told him to call 9-1-1.
- Paramedics found the victim unresponsive with a low body temperature, a small bruise on her forehead, and bruising on her abdomen; she was transported to Salem Hospital, then to Oregon Health Sciences University Hospital (OHSU) where she underwent brain surgery. Subsequent testing at OHSU showed the victim's brain was no longer functioning, and she was taken off life support on June 30, 2002.
- An autopsy revealed a quart and a half of blood in her abdomen due to a torn mesentery, a swollen brain, retinal hemorrhaging, and bleeding at the base of the optic nerve; the medical examiner concluded these acute injuries were caused by violent shaking or impact within 24-36 hours of death.
- The autopsy also showed the victim had suffered other injuries in the weeks and months before her death, including healing fractures to three ribs, a femur, and possible old fractures on her tibia and fibula.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant Terry Dean Davis was charged with murder and manslaughter in Marion County Circuit Court.
- In a first trial, a mistrial was declared due to juror misconduct.
- Defendant was reindicted in 2005 on charges of murder and manslaughter, with the state alleging the fatal injuries occurred on or between June 29 and 30, 2002.
- The trial court (Marion County Circuit Court) excluded various pieces of evidence offered by the defense, including: (1) Payne's statement to Ecklund that the victim reminded her of her brain-injured daughter, (2) Payne's lay opinion that the victim looked like she might be suffering from a brain injury, and (3) evidence of the victim's prior physical abuse to support defense expert opinions.
- Defendant was convicted of one count of murder and one count of manslaughter in the circuit court.
- Defendant appealed his convictions to the Oregon Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling excluding Payne's testimony that she told Ecklund the victim resembled her brain-injured daughter, but affirmed the trial court's rulings excluding Payne's lay opinion and evidence of the victim's prior physical abuse.
- The State of Oregon petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for review of the Court of Appeals' decision. Defendant cross-petitioned regarding the rulings affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does the Oregon Evidence Code (OEC) allow a defendant to introduce: (1) a lay witness's statement that she told the victim's mother the victim resembled her brain-injured daughter; (2) a lay witness's opinion that the victim appeared to suffer from symptoms of a brain injury or dehydration, based on personal experience; or (3) evidence of the victim's prior physical abuse as a basis for expert testimony on the timing of fatal injuries, and if such evidence was wrongly excluded, was that error harmless under Oregon law?
Opinions:
Majority - Walters, J.
No, regarding Payne's statement to Ecklund, the trial court did not err in excluding Payne's testimony that she told Ecklund the victim reminded her of her own daughter when her daughter was 'really sick.' While Ecklund likely understood this to mean a brain injury, her belief in the possibility of a brain injury on June 25 was not relevant to the jury's medical determination of when the fatal injuries actually occurred. Since Ecklund took the child to the hospital and dehydration was diagnosed, her subsequent failure to report Payne's observations to later medical personnel was not inferential of withholding information about a brain injury. Yes, regarding Payne's lay opinion, the trial court erred in excluding Payne's lay opinion testimony (that the victim looked like she 'had pressure on the brain or else she was dehydrated') and the background explanation of her daughter's condition. Payne's opinion was rationally based on her extensive personal experience observing her own brain-injured and dehydrated child, satisfying OEC 701(1). It was helpful to the jury (OEC 701(2)) because it corroborated defense experts' testimony that the victim's injuries occurred several days before death, increasing the probability of that theory. The trial court's exclusion based on Payne not being 'certain' was an incorrect application of OEC 701, as the rule only requires the opinion to be based on personal knowledge, not certainty, and allows for multiple inferences. This error was not harmless because allowing only testimony about dehydration reinforced the state's innocuous explanation for June 25, while denying the jury additional evidence supporting an earlier brain injury, thereby undermining the defendant's case. Yes, regarding evidence of the victim's prior physical abuse, the trial court erred in excluding this evidence as a basis for the defense experts' opinions. Defendant did not offer this evidence to prove character or prior bad acts under OEC 404(3), but to explain the basis for his experts' conclusions that the fatal injuries occurred several days before June 29, satisfying OEC 703 and 705. The fact that the victim had suffered repeated serious injuries supported the experts' view that she could have suffered the fatal brain and abdominal injuries earlier. The trial court's OEC 403 ruling regarding jury confusion was flawed; while determining who caused prior injuries was irrelevant, the fact of prior abuse as a basis for expert opinion was relevant and necessary for the jury to evaluate the experts' conclusions. This error was not harmless as it went directly to the core of the defense's theory, impacting the jury's assessment of reasonable doubt.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the admissibility of lay opinion under OEC 701, affirming that personal experience can form a rational basis for an opinion even if not medically certain, and that the opinion need not be the most probable inference. It also reinforces that expert witnesses are entitled to present the full evidentiary basis for their conclusions, including a victim's prior medical history (even if suggestive of abuse), provided it serves a permissible purpose other than proving character or propensity. Furthermore, the decision solidifies Oregon's stringent 'little likelihood' standard for harmless error, emphasizing that an appellate court must assess the error's direct impact on the jury's verdict, particularly when it undermines a defendant's central theory, rather than weighing the overall evidence of guilt. This provides crucial guidance for trial courts on evidentiary rulings and appellate courts on review.
