State v. Davis
216 N.W.2d 31, 63 Wis. 2d 75, 1974 Wisc. LEXIS 1438 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant's good-faith reliance on an authorized legal opinion from a governmental counsel, whose statutory duties include providing such advice, constitutes a valid defense to a subsequent criminal prosecution for the actions taken.
Facts:
- A defendant, a public official, contemplated taking certain actions in their official capacity.
- The defendant was concerned about the potential illegality of these actions.
- The defendant sought legal advice from the corporation counsel for Marathon county regarding the propriety of the actions.
- The defendant also consulted the assistant district attorney for Portage county on the same matter.
- Both governmental attorneys advised the defendant that the proposed course of action was legally permissible.
- Relying in good faith on these assurances, the defendant proceeded with the actions in an open and unconcealed manner.
- The defendant was subsequently criminally prosecuted under sec. 946.13, Stats., for the very actions the attorneys had approved.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was charged with a criminal violation in a Wisconsin trial court.
- Following a trial, a judgment of conviction was entered against the defendant.
- The defendant, as the appellant, appealed the judgment of conviction to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
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Issue:
Is a defendant's good-faith reliance on the authorized legal advice of a governmental counsel a valid defense to a criminal prosecution resulting from actions taken based on that advice?
Opinions:
Majority - Hanley, J.
Yes. A defendant's good-faith reliance on the authorized legal advice of a governmental counsel is a valid defense to a criminal prosecution. While ignorance of the law is generally not an excuse, a blind application of that rule would violate the principle of 'fundamental fairness' implicit in the justice system. It would impose an 'unconscionable rigidity' to prosecute an individual who relies in good faith on an opinion from a government official statutorily required to provide it. This case is distinguished from precedents like Hopkins v. State, where the advising official had no statutory duty to render the opinion and the defendant had no legal right to rely upon it.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant 'advice of counsel' or 'entrapment by estoppel' defense, specifically for public officials acting within the scope of their duties. It carves out a 'fundamental fairness' exception to the strict maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse ('ignorantia juris non excusat'). This precedent protects public officials who act in good faith after seeking required legal guidance, preventing them from being criminally penalized for relying on the very legal system designed to guide them. Future cases will likely test the boundaries of what constitutes 'good faith' and which governmental counsel opinions are 'authorized' for this defense to apply.
