State v. Davis
1994 WL 201131, 637 So. 2d 1012 (1994)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The joinder of two or more offenses in a single trial, even capital offenses, is permissible and does not require severance unless the defendant meets the heavy burden of proving that the jury would be unable to compartmentalize the evidence for each offense, leading to unfair prejudice.
Facts:
- On June 22, 1990, Percy Davis purchased a .25 automatic pistol from a pawn shop.
- Around 2:00 a.m. on June 29, 1990, Davis told an acquaintance, Jerome Mitchell, that he needed money, took his pistol, and entered a Circle K convenience store.
- After Davis returned to his car, he displayed money that Mitchell had not seen before; inside the store, employee Mark Sanchez was found with three fatal gunshot wounds from Davis's pistol.
- Around midnight on June 30, 1990, Davis and another acquaintance, Rodney Hill, entered the Fat's Exxon convenience store.
- A video camera recorded Davis shooting the owner, Calvin Moore, at point-blank range, shooting at Moore's wife, Norma, and robbing the cash register.
- After the surveillance video was broadcast on local news, Hill identified Davis to the police.
- When police located Davis, he gave his pistol to his cousin, Marlin Rogers, and told him to hide it; the pistol was recovered from Rogers upon their arrest.
- In a statement to police, Davis admitted to robbing and shooting Calvin Moore but denied involvement in the Sanchez murder, while also stating that he had exclusive control of his pistol and car during the time of both murders.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Louisiana charged Percy Davis with two counts of first-degree murder in a single indictment.
- Prior to trial, Davis filed a motion to sever the two counts, arguing that a joint trial would be unfairly prejudicial. The trial court denied the motion.
- Davis also filed motions to suppress his confession, physical evidence (the pistol), and an eyewitness identification, all of which the trial court denied.
- Following a trial, a jury found Davis guilty on both counts of first-degree murder.
- In the penalty phase of the trial, the same jury recommended a sentence of death for each of the two murders.
- The trial court formally sentenced Davis to death on both counts.
- Davis filed a direct appeal of his convictions and sentences to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does trying a defendant for two separate first-degree murders in a single trial create undue prejudice that requires severance when the evidence for one murder is direct and graphic while the evidence for the other is largely circumstantial?
Opinions:
Majority - Marvin, Justice Ad Hoc
No, trying the defendant for both murders in a single trial does not create undue prejudice requiring severance. A defendant bears a heavy burden to prove that joinder of offenses is so prejudicial that a fair trial is impossible. In this case, the evidence for each murder was sufficiently 'compartmentalized,' as the crimes occurred on different nights, at different locations, and involved different primary witnesses. The jury's return of different aggravating circumstances for each count further indicates that it considered the evidence for each murder separately and was not confused or unduly prejudiced by the graphic video evidence of the Moore murder when considering the circumstantial evidence of the Sanchez murder. The trial court's instructions to consider each count separately also helped ensure a fair trial.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high threshold a defendant must meet to sever properly joined charges, even in a capital case with differing types of evidence. It establishes that courts will presume a jury can follow instructions to compartmentalize evidence, giving prosecutors considerable discretion to try a defendant for a 'crime spree' in a single, efficient proceeding. The ruling suggests that even the presence of highly inflammatory evidence for one count, such as a video of the murder, does not automatically prejudice the jury's consideration of other counts that rely on less direct, circumstantial evidence.
