State v. Daniels
940 P.2d 690, 87 Wash. App. 149 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
In a prosecution for assault by actual battery, a definitional instruction for 'battery' is not an essential element of the crime, as 'assault' has an everyday meaning; additionally, evidence of other similar uncharged acts may be admissible under ER 404(b) to prove intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident if its probative value outweighs unfair prejudice.
Facts:
- Audie Daniels and M.C. shared a home from May 1994 to April 1995, during which time Daniels often cared for M.C.’s two young children, including S (born June 1, 1993), while M.C. was at work.
- In June 1994, while Daniels was caring for S, the toddler sustained two black eyes, bruises on her face, neck, and back of her head, and blood on her ears; Daniels told M.C. the injuries resulted from a fall, but a doctor testified the injuries were unlikely from a single blow and represented a grip mark.
- In October 1994, M.C. noticed new bruises and swelling on S’s head after Daniels had been home alone with the child; Daniels explained he had spanked S “all the way up the stairs and she had banged her head off of each step.”
- In January 1995, while Daniels was again with S, the child suffered a leg injury; Daniels told M.C. S twisted her ankle jumping from a couch and he had “spanked her and set her down real hard,” but a doctor testified S had fractured ankle bones, an unusual injury for a 19-month-old, inconsistent with twisting, and requiring significant force.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Audie Daniels with two counts of second-degree assault of a child committed by actual battery.
- At trial, the judge instructed the jury using the statutory language for the elements of the crime, defining 'intentionally' and 'recklessly,' but did not include a specific instruction defining 'battery.'
- The jury found Daniels guilty on both counts.
- Daniels appealed his conviction to the Washington Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court's failure to define 'battery' was manifest constitutional error and that the admission of testimony about an uncharged incident was erroneous.
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Issue:
1. Does the definition of 'battery' constitute an element of the crime of assault by actual battery, requiring a specific jury instruction even if not requested? 2. Did the trial court err by admitting evidence of a prior uncharged incident of abuse under ER 404(b)?
Opinions:
Majority - Becker, J.
No, the definition of battery is not an element of the crime of assault by actual battery. The trial court's instructions, which mirrored the statutory language for second-degree assault and defined "intentionally" and "recklessly," adequately informed the jury of the elements. The Supreme Court of Washington has recognized three forms of assault: attempted battery, actual battery, and common law assault (apprehension of harm). While the first and third forms require specific intent, assault by actual battery does not, and the statutory language describing the mental state (intentionally assaulting and recklessly inflicting substantial bodily harm) is sufficient. The term 'assault' is understood by laymen in its everyday meaning, which encompasses actual battery, and thus a separate definitional instruction for 'battery' is not an additional element. If Daniels desired a specific definition, he should have requested one at trial to avoid potential confusion. Furthermore, no, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the uncharged October 1994 incident under ER 404(b). The evidence was relevant to show Daniels’ intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident regarding the charged incidents. The State had the burden to prove Daniels acted recklessly, meaning he knew of and disregarded a substantial risk. The prior incident showed Daniels’ knowledge of the risk of harm from extreme discipline and demonstrated his intentional excessive discipline. While the evidence was undoubtedly prejudicial due to its similarity to the charged conduct, this similarity also made it highly relevant to the permissible purposes, and the prejudice was not deemed 'unfair' in light of the already established evidence of the charged crimes. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice under ER 403.
Analysis:
This case clarifies that for assault committed by actual battery, the definition of battery itself is not considered an additional 'element' that must be specifically instructed to the jury unless requested, distinguishing it from other forms of assault requiring specific intent. It reinforces the principle that common terms in statutes can be given their everyday meaning. The ruling also affirms the broad discretion of trial courts in admitting 'other acts' evidence under ER 404(b) when relevant to issues like intent or knowledge, particularly in child abuse cases where patterns of behavior can be highly probative of a defendant's mental state.
