State v. Dale R. Neumann
2013 WI 58, 348 Wis.2d 455 (2013)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Wisconsin's second-degree reckless homicide statute and the criminal child abuse statute with its prayer treatment exception provide sufficient due process fair notice that a parent's failure to provide medical care, creating an unreasonable and substantial risk of death of which the parent is subjectively aware, can lead to criminal liability, even if the parent relies on prayer for healing.
Facts:
- On March 23, 2008, 11-year-old Madeline Kara Neumann (Kara) died from diabetic ketoacidosis, a serious illness that had gone untreated.
- Kara's parents, Dale R. Neumann and Leilani E. Neumann, chose to treat her undiagnosed illness with prayer alone, believing that seeking medical care would be "putting the doctor before God."
- For several weeks prior to her death, Kara experienced gradually worsening symptoms including frequent thirst and urination, dehydration, weakness, and exhaustion.
- On the Saturday before her death, Kara was pale, her legs were skinny and blue, and she had slept all day after asking to stay home from work.
- The Neumanns began praying for Kara on Saturday afternoon and enlisted family and friends to join; Leilani refused her mother's suggestion to take Kara to a doctor, stating, "No, she'll be fine, God will heal her."
- By Saturday night, Kara was unable to walk or talk, lay limp and unresponsive, and her brother believed she was in a coma.
- On Sunday afternoon, friends Althea and Randall Wormgoor visited, observed Kara's extremely ill and nonresponsive state, and Randall advised Dale to take her to the hospital, but Dale relayed Leilani's belief that Kara's illness was a "test of faith."
- Emergency medical personnel, alerted by Leilani's sister-in-law, arrived later on Sunday, transported the pulseless Kara to the hospital, but attempts to revive her were unsuccessful; doctors later confirmed her death was due to diabetic ketoacidosis, a treatable condition with a 99.8% survival rate if medical care is provided while the child is still breathing and has a heartbeat.
Procedural Posture:
- Madeline Kara Neumann died on March 23, 2008.
- Dale R. Neumann and Leilani E. Neumann were each charged with second-degree reckless homicide.
- Each parent was convicted of second-degree reckless homicide in separate jury trials in the Circuit Court for Marathon County, Vincent K. Howard, Judge.
- Each parent appealed their judgment of conviction and orders denying postconviction relief to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals (appellants: Dale R. Neumann and Leilani E. Neumann; appellee: State).
- The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases for appellate decision.
- The Court of Appeals certified the cases to the Wisconsin Supreme Court for review.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the interplay between Wisconsin's second-degree reckless homicide statute (Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1)) and the criminal child abuse statute's prayer treatment exception (Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6)) violate parents' due process right to fair notice, such that parents who rely on prayer for healing their child cannot be held criminally liable if the child dies?
Opinions:
Majority - Shirley S. Abrahamson, C.J.
No, the parents' convictions for second-degree reckless homicide should not be reversed on the ground that the statutes failed to provide fair notice. The court concludes that Wisconsin's second-degree reckless homicide statute and the criminal child abuse statute with its prayer treatment exception are sufficiently distinct and provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct. The prayer treatment provision (Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6)) explicitly and exclusively limits its application to charges under the criminal child abuse statute (§ 948.03) and does not immunize parents from criminal liability under any other statute, including second-degree reckless homicide (§ 940.06(1)). The provision's text, including the word "solely," confirms this narrow scope. The court rejects the parents' due process fair notice challenge, which hinges on the shared phrase "great bodily harm" (bodily injury creating a substantial risk of death) in both the homicide and child abuse statutes. While the phrase is present, the statutes differ in three critical respects: 1. Reckless Nature of Conduct: Second-degree reckless homicide requires conduct creating an "unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm," a higher threshold than the child abuse statutes' "unreasonable risk of harm to a child" or "high probability of great bodily harm." 2. Mental State (Mens Rea): Crucially, second-degree reckless homicide requires a subjective mens rea: the actor must be subjectively aware of the unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm. In contrast, the criminal child abuse statute (Wis. Stat. § 948.03) does not contain a subjective mens rea component, only requiring that the conduct demonstrates a conscious disregard for the child's safety. This subjective awareness requirement mitigates vagueness, as an actor who is aware of their conduct's risk cannot claim ignorance. 3. Harm Caused: Homicide requires the death of the victim, while the child abuse statutes require great bodily harm or bodily harm. Accepting the parents' interpretation would effectively immunize prayer-treating parents from reckless homicide, as they would not know when their conduct crossed a line until death occurred. The court reaffirms the longstanding parental legal duty to provide necessary medical care for a child, drawing on precedents like State v. Williquette and Cole v. Sears Roebuck & Co. This duty aligns with the state's parens patriae interest in protecting children and does not violate parents' fundamental right to direct the care of their children, as these rights are not absolute and do not extend to exposing a child to "ill health or death" (Prince v. Massachusetts). The court also found that the jury instructions on parental duty and religious belief were not erroneous, accurately distinguishing between absolute religious belief and regulable conduct. The court rejected the argument for a specific jury instruction on sincere religious belief negating subjective awareness, stating that the existing instructions adequately covered the subjective awareness element of the crime. Furthermore, the court found no ineffective assistance of counsel and that the father's jury was not objectively biased by being informed of the mother's prior conviction, given the circumstances and precautionary measures taken by the trial court.
Dissenting - David T. Prosser, J.
Yes, the statutes, when considered together, do not provide clear and fair notice to parents who rely on prayer treatment about when their conduct becomes criminal. The laws are imprecise and confusing. The dissent highlights the difficulty in quickly recognizing the severity of diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA), noting that even medical professionals sometimes miss the diagnosis, as seen in Maurin v. Hall. This complexity makes it harder to assert that parents would have clear subjective awareness of the risk in every DKA case. Justice Prosser argues that there is a significant and problematic overlap between Wis. Stat. § 940.06 (second-degree reckless homicide) and Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(c) (reckless child abuse causing bodily harm with a high probability of great bodily harm). Both statutes regulate virtually identical conduct concerning the creation of high risk to a child, yet only § 948.03 includes the prayer treatment immunity. This creates a due process problem because a parent, relying in good faith on the prayer exemption, cannot discern at what point their protected conduct under one statute transitions into criminal liability under another that describes similar conduct but lacks the exemption. The majority's semantic distinctions between "high probability of great bodily harm" and "substantial risk of death or great bodily harm" are too subtle to provide the required fair notice for criminal liability. Moreover, the subjective awareness requirement in reckless homicide is insufficient to cure this vagueness if the vagueness makes it impossible for parents to know what conduct is unlawful in the first place, especially when another statute appears to protect similar actions. The dissent suggests the State's decision to prosecute under the reckless homicide statute, rather than the child neglect statute (Wis. Stat. § 948.21), which includes an explicit "intentional" element and established jury instructions for parental duty in cases of omission, unnecessarily complicated the legal framework and contributed to the notice problem. The jury instructions provided were inconsistent regarding parental duty and failed to adequately integrate the concept of religious motivation or the effect of the prayer treatment exemption. The single instruction on religious freedom, without further context, effectively repudiated the defense's position. The dissent also finds it troubling that Dale Neumann's jury was explicitly informed of Leilani Neumann's prior conviction for the same crime, given the shared facts and joint decisions, making it difficult to believe the jurors could remain unbiased.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the limited scope of statutory 'prayer treatment' exceptions in criminal law, establishing that such exceptions are narrowly construed and do not provide blanket immunity from more serious charges like reckless homicide. It powerfully reinforces the state's paramount parens patriae interest in protecting children's lives, holding that this interest can outweigh parental claims of religious freedom when a child's life is at severe risk. The decision underscores the critical role of subjective mens rea in reckless homicide cases, distinguishing it from child abuse statutes that may apply lower culpability standards. This distinction is vital for understanding future criminal liability stemming from parental omissions and religious beliefs.
