State v. Cude
14 Utah 2d 287, 383 P.2d 399, 1963 Utah LEXIS 206 (1963)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant in a larceny case is entitled to a specific jury instruction regarding a 'claim of right' defense if they present any evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that they took the property with a good faith belief of having a right to it, as such a belief negates the requisite intent to steal.
Facts:
- The defendant left his automobile at a garage for repairs, with an initial cost estimate of around $180.
- Evidence suggested the defendant authorized the repairs regardless of the final cost.
- Upon returning, the defendant was presented with a final repair bill of $345, which he was unable to pay.
- The garageman, asserting a possessory lien for the unpaid bill, refused to return the car to the defendant.
- After the garage had closed for the night, the defendant used a duplicate key to take the automobile from the garage premises without permission.
- The defendant later contended that he took the car for the purpose of selling it to raise money to pay the repair bill.
Procedural Posture:
- The State prosecuted the defendant for grand larceny in a state trial court.
- At trial, the defendant requested a specific jury instruction on the defense that he could not be guilty if he honestly believed he had a right to the car's possession.
- The trial court refused to give the requested instruction.
- The jury returned a verdict convicting the defendant of grand larceny.
- The defendant (as appellant) appealed the conviction to the state's highest court, arguing the trial court erred by refusing his requested jury instruction.
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit a reversible error by refusing to give a specific jury instruction on the defense of 'claim of right' when a defendant presents evidence that they took property with the good faith belief they were entitled to it?
Opinions:
Majority - Callister, J.
Yes. The trial court's refusal to give the requested instruction was a reversible error. An essential element of larceny is the specific intent to steal the property of another. If there is any reasonable basis in the evidence for a jury to believe that the accused took the property under an honest, good faith belief that he had a right to its possession, then the issue of his intent must be presented to the jury. A general instruction that the accused must have an intent to steal is insufficient to cover this specific defense theory. The credibility of the defendant's claim is a question for the jury to decide, and depriving them of the proper legal framework to evaluate it deprives the defendant of a fair trial.
Dissenting - Henriod, C.J.
No. The trial court did not err in refusing the instruction. The defendant's own actions and testimony contradict any claim of a good faith belief; he was explicitly denied possession of the car and then took it surreptitiously at night. His stated intent to sell the car, with no intention of returning it to the garageman, supports the requisite intent for larceny by conversion of a security right. To instruct the jury on a 'claim of right' theory under these facts would 'flout the defendant's own testimony' and be unrealistic.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the importance of mens rea (a guilty mind) as a fundamental element of larceny and clarifies the 'claim of right' doctrine as a complete defense. The decision establishes that a defendant's subjective belief, if supported by some evidence, must be considered by the jury, even if the belief is objectively unreasonable or mistaken. It reinforces the distinct roles of judge and jury, holding that the judge cannot usurp the jury's function of determining the credibility of a defendant's claimed state of mind. This precedent makes it more difficult for prosecutors to secure larceny convictions where a defendant can plausibly assert they believed they had a right to the property.
