State v. Cromedy
158 N.J. 112, 1999 N.J. LEXIS 386, 727 A.2d 457 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
When identification is a critical issue in a criminal case and the eyewitness's cross-racial identification is not corroborated by other independent evidence, a trial court must provide a special jury instruction to alert the jury to the potential influence of race on eyewitness accuracy.
Facts:
- On the night of August 28, 1992, D.S., a white female Rutgers University student, was watching television in her brightly-lit basement apartment in New Brunswick.
- An African-American male intruder entered D.S.'s apartment, demanded money, then spotted her purse, rifled through it, and removed money and credit cards.
- The intruder then led D.S. into the brightly-lit kitchen and sexually assaulted her, after which he threatened her again and left; D.S. was approximately two feet away from him at the time of the second threat.
- Immediately after the intruder left, D.S. called the New Brunswick Police Department and described her assailant as an African-American male in his late 20's to early 30's, about five feet five inches tall, with a medium build, mustache, and unkempt hair.
- In the days following the incident, D.S. made a formal statement, assisted an artist in drawing a composite sketch, and viewed many slides and photographs, including one of defendant McKinley Cromedy, but was unsuccessful in identifying her assailant.
- On April 7, 1993, almost eight months after the crimes, D.S. saw an African-American male across the street whom she believed to be her attacker, studying his face and gait as they passed.
- D.S. immediately called the police with a description, and defendant McKinley Cromedy was picked up by New Brunswick police and taken to headquarters shortly thereafter.
- Within fifteen minutes of seeing him on the street, D.S. viewed defendant in a 'show-up' from behind a one-way mirror and immediately identified him as the man she had just seen on the street and as her attacker.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant McKinley Cromedy was tried in a trial court on charges including first-degree aggravated sexual assault, second-degree robbery, second-degree burglary, and third-degree terroristic threats.
- The trial court denied defendant's request for a specific cross-racial identification jury instruction, instead providing the jury with the standard Model Jury Charge on Identification.
- The jury convicted defendant of all charges.
- Defendant appealed his convictions to the Appellate Division, the intermediate appellate court, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing the cross-racial identification charge.
- A majority of the Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court's decision, finding no error in the refusal to include a cross-racial identification instruction.
- Judge Shebell dissented in the Appellate Division, concluding that a reversal was warranted because the trial court should have given such a charge.
- The case came before the New Jersey Supreme Court as of right due to Judge Shebell's dissent (R. 2:2-1(a)(2)), and the Court also granted certification 'limited solely to the identification issues not covered by the dissenting opinion below.'
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit reversible error by refusing to give a requested cross-racial identification jury instruction when identification is a critical issue in the case and the cross-racial identification is uncorroborated by other evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Coleman, J.
Yes, a trial court commits reversible error by refusing to give a requested cross-racial identification jury instruction when identification is critical and uncorroborated, as such an instruction is necessary to help the jury evaluate the accuracy of the identification. The Court found a reliable basis for a cross-racial identification charge based on recommendations from a Court-appointed Task Force, judicial literature, and decisional law from other jurisdictions. Psychological studies consistently demonstrate an 'own-race effect' or 'cross-racial impairment,' indicating that eyewitnesses are generally better at identifying individuals of their own race than those of another. Although researchers may dispute the precise degree of this effect or its applicability to all traumatic, real-world situations, the Court concluded that the empirical data, coupled with ordinary human experience, provides a sufficient foundation for requiring the instruction. The Court drew parallels to Brown v. Board of Education, which utilized social science findings to inform legal conclusions without requiring strict general acceptance of the scientific methodology. It cited federal cases like United States v. Telfaire and Supreme Court precedents such as United States v. Wade and Manson v. Brathwaite, which have long recognized the inherent fallibility of eyewitness identification, particularly in cross-racial contexts. The New Jersey Supreme Court's own Task Force on Minority Concerns had unanimously recommended such a charge. The Court clarified that this instruction is not based on 'scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge' requiring expert testimony under N.J.R.E. 702; rather, it relies on common knowledge and legislative-type findings, making expert testimony on this specific issue inadmissible. The instruction aims to guide the jury in considering the racial character of the eyewitness identification as one of the 'attendant circumstances' impacting its reliability. Adopting a rule similar to California's, the Court held that the instruction is mandatory when identification is a critical issue and lacks corroboration by other evidence (e.g., forensic findings or additional eyewitness accounts). In this specific case, D.S.'s identification was critical, cross-racial, and entirely uncorroborated by forensic evidence, further complicated by her failure to identify the defendant for nearly eight months despite prior attempts. The failure to provide an instruction on the potential risks associated with cross-racial identification under these circumstances constituted reversible error.
Analysis:
This case significantly enhanced protections for criminal defendants in New Jersey by formally acknowledging the widely accepted 'own-race effect' in eyewitness identification. By mandating a specific jury instruction under certain conditions, the court recognized the potential unreliability of cross-racial identifications as a matter of common human experience supported by social science, eliminating the need for expert testimony on the issue. This decision positions New Jersey among a minority of jurisdictions with a clear rule on cross-racial identification instructions, potentially leading to more rigorous jury deliberations in cases where such identification is critical and uncorroborated. It also illustrates the New Jersey Supreme Court's willingness to incorporate social science findings into judicial practice to ensure fair trials, even without the stringent Daubert or Frye gatekeeping requirements typically applied to expert evidence.
