State v. Courchesne
296 Conn. 622, 998 A.2d 1, 2010 Conn. LEXIS 227 (2010)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under Connecticut's homicide statutes, an infant who is injured in utero, born alive, and subsequently dies from those prenatal injuries is considered a 'person,' and the common-law 'born alive rule' is incorporated into these statutes, allowing for prosecution for murder based on transferred intent.
Facts:
- At approximately 11 p.m. on September 15, 1998, Robert Courchesne and Demetris Rodgers were in Courchesne’s car, arguing over a drug debt he owed Rodgers’ boyfriend.
- Rodgers became upset when Courchesne could not pay the debt.
- Courchesne took a serrated kitchen knife he kept in his car and repeatedly stabbed Rodgers in her chest and back.
- Rodgers, approximately eight and one-half months pregnant, escaped the car, ran a short distance, and collapsed in the street, dying from her wounds.
- About fifteen minutes later, a passerby discovered Rodgers, and emergency medical personnel arrived, attempting to revive her.
- Rodgers was transported to Waterbury Hospital, where she was pronounced dead.
- An emergency department physician performed an emergency cesarean section on Rodgers and delivered her baby, Antonia Rodgers.
- Antonia immediately received resuscitation and was placed on life support for forty-two days, after which life support was removed, and she was pronounced dead due to lack of oxygen to her brain suffered in utero.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Courchesne was apprehended and charged with two counts of murder, one count of capital felony (murder of two or more persons in a single transaction), and one count of capital felony (murder of a person under sixteen years of age) in connection with the deaths of Demetris Rodgers and Antonia Rodgers.
- The trial court, Damiani, J., held a probable cause hearing and found probable cause for the charges, rejecting Courchesne's motion to dismiss the charges related to Antonia's death, ruling that Antonia was a 'person' under the statutes via the 'born alive rule' and that transferred intent applied.
- Courchesne waived a jury trial for the guilt phase and was tried by a three-judge panel.
- The panel found Courchesne guilty on all counts, adopting the trial court's reasoning on the 'born alive rule' and transferred intent.
- Courchesne filed a motion for articulation, which the panel granted in part, affirming its adoption of Judge Damiani's reasoning.
- The trial court, D'Addabbo, J., conducted a penalty phase hearing before a jury, which found an aggravating factor and concluded it outweighed mitigating factors.
- The trial court rendered judgment of guilty and sentenced Courchesne to death for capital felony under § 53a-54b (8) and life imprisonment for capital felony under § 53a-54b (9).
- Courchesne appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
1. Does Connecticut's murder statute, by incorporating the common-law 'born alive rule,' allow for the prosecution of murder when a fetus injured in utero is subsequently born alive and dies from those injuries? 2. Can the doctrine of transferred intent be applied in such a case where the defendant intended to kill the pregnant mother but caused the death of the infant after live birth? 3. Does the application of the 'born alive rule' and transferred intent in this context violate a defendant's due process rights to fair notice and protection against ex post facto laws? 4. What is the proper evidentiary standard, considering modern medical science, for determining if an infant was 'born alive' under the murder statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Palmer, J.
Yes, Connecticut's murder statute incorporates the common-law 'born alive rule,' allowing for prosecution when a fetus injured in utero is subsequently born alive and dies from those injuries. Yes, the doctrine of transferred intent can be applied in such a case. No, the application of the 'born alive rule' and transferred intent does not violate a defendant's due process rights to fair notice or protection against ex post facto laws. The proper evidentiary standard for 'born alive' must consider whether the infant was brain dead at birth. The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Courchesne's motion to dismiss the charges relating to Antonia's death. It held that the common-law 'born alive rule' is a well-established principle in Connecticut, supported by early legal scholars like Chief Justice Zephaniah Swift and consistent with the Penal Code's origins in the Model Penal Code and New York Penal Law. The Court emphasized that while many states have statutorily abrogated the 'born alive rule' to expand protections for fetuses, Connecticut's legislature, through Public Act 03-21 (codified as § 53a-59c), chose to retain the rule by criminalizing the termination of pregnancy without a live birth as an aggravated assault on the mother, implying that live births were already covered by existing homicide laws. This legislative decision, motivated by concerns over abortion rights, signals legislative acceptance of the 'born alive rule' for infants born alive and later dying from prenatal injuries. The Court rejected claims that the rule lacked a temporal nexus or violated due process, finding its application foreseeable and not a novel or indefensible departure from prior law. However, the Court determined that the trial panel applied an incorrect evidentiary standard for determining 'born alive.' Drawing from State v. Guess, which defined death to include brain death, the Court ruled that to prove an infant was 'born alive' in circumstances where life support is immediately used, the state must also disprove that the infant was brain dead at birth. Because the panel failed to apply this standard, a new trial is warranted on the murder and capital felony charges related to Antonia's death, but not an acquittal, as the evidence was sufficient under the standard the panel actually applied.
Concurring - Katz, J.
I concur with the majority's recognition of the 'born alive rule' as part of Connecticut common law. The alternative—a statutory scheme punishing aggravated assault for a fetal death in utero but no enhanced penalty for a live birth followed by death from prenatal injuries—would lead to an anomalous and illogical result, which the legislature could not have intended with Public Act 03-21. While agreeing with the outcome on the 'born alive rule,' I disagree with the majority's decision not to address other penalty phase claims that are likely to re-emerge in any subsequent penalty phase hearing. Providing guidance on these issues would serve judicial economy and prevent unnecessary emotional and financial costs for all parties.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Zarella, J.
I concur with Part I of the majority opinion, affirming the denial of the suppression motion. However, I dissent from Parts II through V, arguing that the majority's adoption of the 'born alive rule' and its application to this case is deeply flawed. The 'born alive rule' is an obsolete evidentiary tool from a time of limited medical knowledge, and its grounds have vanished. The majority's adoption of it effectively amends the statutory definition of 'person' in Connecticut's murder statutes, invading the legislature's exclusive prerogative to define crimes. The rule creates a logically incoherent system where criminal liability depends on arbitrary factors like the timing of death relative to birth, which makes no sense. The murder statute's language, particularly the term 'when, with intent to cause the death of another person,' mandates a temporal nexus between the intent and the victim's personhood at the time of the criminal act, which a fetus does not satisfy. The legislative history of Public Act 03-21 does not demonstrate legislative acceptance of the 'born alive rule' for live births but rather avoided granting independent legal rights to a fetus to sidestep abortion debates. Applying this novel interpretation retroactively violates the defendant's due process right to fair notice, especially in a capital felony case. The rule of lenity should compel resolving this ambiguity in favor of the defendant, leading to a conclusion that murder charges cannot apply to Antonia's death. Furthermore, the Penal Code abrogated common-law crimes, making any historical common-law analysis irrelevant.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Schaller, J.
I concur with Part I of the majority opinion, affirming the denial of the suppression motion. However, I dissent from Parts II through V, agreeing with Justice Zarella that the 'born alive rule' is antiquated, illogical, and incoherent, and that Connecticut's murder statute requires the victim to be a 'person' at the time of the criminal act. The defendant's due process rights to fair notice were violated because Connecticut law in 1998 did not provide sufficient notice that stabbing a pregnant woman, an act that was not independently criminal as to the fetus, could lead to a second murder charge and the death penalty simply because of an emergency cesarean section. The statutory omission of explicit 'born alive' language, the lack of prior authoritative Connecticut appellate decisions on the rule, and the irrelevance of subsequent legislative history (Public Act 03-21) all point to a lack of fair warning. The majority's retroactive application of the 'born alive rule' and a novel interpretation of transferred intent in a capital case is 'unexpected and indefensible.' Even if constitutionally permissible, the state failed to prove at trial that Antonia was 'born alive' under the State v. Guess brain-death standard, which was foreseeable prior to trial. Therefore, the defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal, not a new trial, as a new trial would violate his double jeopardy rights by giving the state a second chance to prove its case.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies Connecticut's homicide law regarding unborn victims, firmly incorporating the common-law 'born alive rule' into the state's Penal Code despite statutory silence. The Court's nuanced interpretation of legislative intent, particularly Public Act 03-21, highlights the ongoing tension between protecting fetal life and abortion rights, shaping how future legislative efforts to expand fetal homicide laws will be viewed. The application of the 'brain-death' standard from State v. Guess to determine 'born alive' status is a crucial development, requiring the state to present sophisticated medical evidence of brain function in cases involving infants on life support after prenatal injury, which will likely raise the bar for successful prosecution in such circumstances. The ruling reinforces that the timing of death (pre- or post-birth from prenatal injury) dictates the nature of the criminal charge (aggravated assault vs. murder/capital felony), potentially creating a complex framework for prosecutors and defense attorneys in cases involving pregnant victims.
