State v. Cottrell
445 P.3d 1132 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
In a conspiracy case, multiple overt acts committed in furtherance of a single conspiratorial agreement do not constitute either 'multiple acts' or 'alternative means' requiring a jury unanimity instruction, as the agreement itself is the crux of the offense.
Facts:
- On June 5, 2013, Detective Eduardo Padron arranged a controlled drug buy from Jennifer Curtis based on a tip that she was illegally selling prescription drugs.
- Curtis texted Padron that her 'father' had the product and that she would need to contact him, eventually confirming the requested 8 oxycodone and 20 hydrocodone pills were ready.
- Curtis and Padron agreed to meet at a QuikTrip, where surveillance officers observed individuals appearing to conduct 'counter surveillance' activity.
- Ronald Cottrell arrived at the QuikTrip in a blue pickup truck and spoke with Curtis.
- After Padron refused Curtis's request to relocate, Cottrell (whose voice was heard saying 'Fuck it, let's just do it here') exited his truck and entered Padron's vehicle.
- Inside Padron's vehicle, Cottrell introduced himself as 'Randy,' called Curtis his 'daughter,' and exchanged a pill bottle (described as 'an 8 and 20') for $350 cash.
- A forensic scientist later confirmed the pill bottle contained 20 hydrocodone pills and 8 oxycodone pills.
- Approximately a week later, Padron attempted a second purchase from Curtis, who again referenced her 'pops' having the product and stated she only handled 'clientele' not 'money' or 'merch,' but the sale ultimately fell through.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Ronald Cottrell with distribution of hydrocodone, distribution of oxycodone, and conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in Sedgwick District Court.
- At trial, after the State rested, Cottrell moved for a judgment of acquittal, claiming insufficient evidence, which the district court denied.
- The jury found Cottrell guilty on all counts.
- At sentencing, Cottrell renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal, but the district court denied it again.
- Cottrell appealed to the Kansas Court of Appeals, challenging the conspiracy jury instruction (multiple acts/alternative means), the culpable mental state instruction for distribution, and the denial of his motion for acquittal.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment.
- Cottrell filed a petition for review with the Kansas Supreme Court, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a jury instruction listing several overt acts in furtherance of a single conspiracy present a 'multiple acts' problem or 'alternative means' for committing the crime of conspiracy, thereby requiring a special jury unanimity instruction?
Opinions:
Majority - Stegall, J.
No, a jury instruction listing several overt acts in furtherance of a single conspiracy does not present a 'multiple acts' problem or 'alternative means' for committing the crime of conspiracy, and therefore, a special jury unanimity instruction is not required. For 'multiple acts,' the court reasoned that the 'crux of the offense' in a conspiracy case is the agreement itself, not the various overt acts. Multiple acts require legally and factually separate incidents that independently satisfy all elements of the charged offense. Since the State presented evidence of only one agreement between Cottrell and Curtis to illegally sell drugs, there was only one conspiracy, regardless of the number of overt acts proved. For 'alternative means,' the court clarified that alternative means are 'legislatively determined, distinct, material elements of a crime,' as defined by the statute. The conspiracy statute merely requires an overt act, and a jury instruction listing multiple overt acts simply describes factual scenarios that could prove this single material element, rather than creating alternative means. The court specifically overruled State v. Enriquez on this point, emphasizing that only statutory language, not jury instructions, can create alternative means. The court also held that Cottrell invited any error regarding the 'knowingly' culpable mental state instruction for drug distribution because he actively requested it and did not object to the final version. Finally, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to uphold the denial of Cottrell's motion for acquittal, concluding that a rational fact-finder could infer an agreement to conspire and knowing distribution from Curtis's texts, Cottrell's actions, and his statements during the transaction.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the application of the 'multiple acts' and 'alternative means' doctrines in Kansas conspiracy law, solidifying that the conspiratorial agreement, not the individual overt acts, is the defining element of the crime. By definitively stating that only statutory language can create alternative means, the Court restricts the ability of jury instructions to inadvertently expand or alter the legislative definition of a crime. This provides clearer guidance for prosecutors and trial courts regarding the specificity required in jury instructions and the scope of jury unanimity in conspiracy cases, ensuring that proof of any single overt act is sufficient to satisfy that element, rather than requiring individual juror agreement on specific acts or means.
