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STATE of Idaho v. Freddy Allen COTTON

Supreme Court of Idaho
602 P.2d 71 (1979)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

While it is an error for a trial court to refuse a defendant's request for a specific, previously approved jury instruction defining 'reasonable doubt,' such an error is not prejudicial and does not require reversal if the instruction that was given, though criticized, is not so confusing, misleading, or erroneous as to misstate the law.


Facts:

  • On the evening of April 2, 1977, Freddy Allen Cotton accosted a victim in a well-lit underpass in Pocatello.
  • According to the victim's testimony, Cotton, at knifepoint, forced the victim to give him his wallet.
  • The victim further testified that Cotton then forced him to remove his trousers, attempted anal intercourse, and forced him to perform fellatio.
  • Cotton then ordered the victim to accompany him to his house for further sexual acts.
  • A young woman walked past the two men, and upon reaching a bar, she called the police, leading to Cotton's arrest shortly thereafter.
  • Cotton testified that the victim had made homosexual advances to him, accosted him with a knife which he took, and then offered him money for sexual acts.

Procedural Posture:

  • The State of Idaho charged Freddy Allen Cotton by information with robbery, attempted infamous crime against nature, infamous crime against nature, and second degree kidnapping.
  • The case was tried before a jury in an Idaho district court (trial court).
  • At the close of the state's evidence, Cotton moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied.
  • The jury rendered a verdict of guilty on all four counts.
  • The trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Cotton to a term of imprisonment.
  • Cotton, as appellant, appealed the judgment of conviction and the sentence to the Supreme Court of Idaho, the state's highest court.

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Issue:

Does a trial court commit prejudicial, reversible error by refusing to give a previously approved jury instruction defining 'reasonable doubt' and instead giving an older, criticized instruction on the same concept?


Opinions:

Majority - Justice McFadden

No, the trial court's refusal to give the defendant's requested instruction was an error, but it was not prejudicial error requiring reversal of the conviction. While the court should have given the approved California jury instruction on reasonable doubt as mandated in State v. Holm, the instruction that was actually given was not so confusing, misleading, or erroneous as to require a new trial. The court reasoned that past cases had criticized the language of the given instruction but had not found it to be a misstatement of the law sufficient to constitute reversible error. The instruction, while not ideal, did not contain legal errors and was not so confusing that a jury would be unable to perform its duty. Therefore, the court affirms the conviction while reiterating that all Idaho courts must use the preferred California instruction in future criminal cases.


Concurring - Justice Bakes

Yes, I concur that there was no prejudicial error, but I question the majority's wholesale approval of the California jury instruction. The instruction itself is problematic, using undefined and potentially confusing terms like 'moral evidence' and 'moral certainty'. It is debatable whether this instruction clarifies the concept of 'reasonable doubt' any better than the instruction the trial court actually gave. The phrase 'reasonable doubt' may be self-explanatory, and attempts to define it, whether through the California instruction or others, might confuse the jury more than they help.


Concurring - Justice Bistline

Yes, I agree that the failure to give the approved instruction was not reversible error, as I do not believe giving the preferred instruction would have produced a different result in this case. However, since Justice Bakes has questioned the validity of the approved California instruction, the Court should delve more deeply into crafting a better one. The California instruction is not without its own flaws. I propose an alternative instruction that uses more common language and directly asks jurors to apply the standard of proof they would want for themselves if they were a defendant.



Analysis:

This case solidifies the harmless error doctrine in the context of jury instructions on reasonable doubt in Idaho. While the court strongly admonishes lower courts to follow its prior mandate in State v. Holm to use a specific instruction (CALJIC 2.90), it demonstrates a high bar for what constitutes prejudicial error. The decision signals that an imperfect or criticized instruction on reasonable doubt will not, by itself, lead to a reversal unless it contains an actual misstatement of the law or is exceptionally misleading. This creates a clear procedural rule for future cases but also shows the court's reluctance to overturn jury verdicts for instructional errors that it deems non-prejudicial to the outcome.

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