State v. Cornell
842 P.2d 394, 1992 Ore. LEXIS 228, 314 Or. 673 (1992)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Out-of-court statements by a non-testifying coconspirator are admissible against a defendant and do not violate the constitutional right to confrontation if the statements were made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The coconspirator exemption from the hearsay rule is a 'firmly rooted' exception, meaning its reliability can be inferred without a separate judicial inquiry into its trustworthiness.
Facts:
- Defendant Cornell and Mark Allen Pinnell obtained the victim John Ruffner's name and phone number from a magazine for sexual contacts.
- Accompanied by Velma Varzali, Cornell and Pinnell drove to Ruffner's residence.
- Cornell and Pinnell entered Ruffner's home while Varzali remained in the car.
- Several hours later, the two men returned to the car and loaded it with personal property they had taken from Ruffner's residence.
- Later that day, Cornell wrote checks on Ruffner's account and used his credit cards.
- The next day, Ruffner's body was discovered in his apartment, 'hog-tied' with an electric cord; he had died of asphyxiation.
- When arrested a few days later, Cornell possessed Ruffner's checkbook and credit cards and was wearing two of his rings.
- Approximately ten days before the Ruffner homicide, Cornell and Pinnell had assaulted and robbed another man, Randy Brown, in a similar fashion.
Procedural Posture:
- Cornell and Pinnell were indicted for aggravated murder and felony murder in trial court.
- Cornell's motion for a separate trial from Pinnell was granted.
- At his trial, the court admitted eleven statements made by Pinnell over Cornell's objection.
- A jury acquitted Cornell of aggravated murder but convicted him on two counts of felony murder.
- Cornell (appellant) appealed his conviction to the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing the admission of Pinnell's statements was an error.
- The Court of Appeals (appellee being the State of Oregon) affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Oregon Supreme Court granted review to consider Cornell's challenge.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the admission of a non-testifying coconspirator's statements, which satisfy the requirements of the Oregon Evidence Code's coconspirator exemption (OEC 801(4)(b)(E)), violate a criminal defendant's right to confrontation under the Oregon and United States Constitutions?
Opinions:
Majority - Unis, J.
No. The admission of a non-testifying coconspirator's statements that satisfy OEC 801(4)(b)(E) does not violate a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. The court found that the coconspirator statement exemption from the hearsay rule is a 'firmly rooted' exception, meaning its reliability can be inferred without requiring a separate, particularized showing of trustworthiness. The court held that to be admissible, the statements must meet a three-part test: 1) a conspiracy existed involving both the defendant and the declarant, 2) the statement was made during the course of the conspiracy, and 3) the statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy's objectives. Citing the long history of this evidentiary rule, the court concluded that statements meeting these criteria are reliable enough to satisfy the confrontation clauses of both the Oregon and U.S. Constitutions, aligning with the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Bourjaily v. United States.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the coconspirator statement exemption as a 'firmly rooted' hearsay exception under Oregon constitutional law, harmonizing it with the federal standard. By doing so, the court relieves the prosecution from the burden of proving the particularized reliability of each coconspirator statement, provided it meets the established three-part test. This ruling streamlines the admission of crucial evidence in conspiracy cases and clarifies that the Confrontation Clause is not a barrier when an out-of-court statement falls within this well-established evidentiary category.
