No, this mistake isn't big enough for a new trial in this case. The prosecutor absolutely should not have hinted that Cornell would just walk free. However, Cornell, acting as his own lawyer, didn't make the right objection. Besides that, the damage was limited because the witness corrected the prosecutor, and Cornell's 'temporary insanity' defense was very weak and unbelievable. Since the evidence clearly showed he was guilty, the prosecutor's mistake likely didn't change the jury's mind.

No, the conviction should stand. But I disagree with the majority on two things. First, a defendant can't be both their own lawyer and have a lawyer help conduct the trial; it's one or the other. Second, since there was an error in the death sentence, the case should have been sent back to the original trial judge to decide the sentence again, not just changed to life in prison by our court.

No mistakes were made by the court. Cornell chose to represent himself and knew what that meant. The way the charges were read to the jury was okay, and even though the prosecutor did some things wrong, it didn't ruin the fairness of the trial. But, because one of the reasons for giving him the death penalty isn't valid anymore, the court changed his punishment to life in prison without the chance of getting out for 25 years. The court also noted that a person can't switch between having a lawyer and representing themselves whenever they want, and the judge has the final say on this.

I agree with upholding Cornell's convictions, but I don't think the rules allow for a mix of self-representation and having a lawyer. If there's no right to this, then the judge can't allow it. I disagree with the court changing the death sentence to life in prison without first letting the trial judge reconsider. When a reason for the death penalty is removed and it's not good to reevaluate the sentence just based on the court record, we should send it back to the trial judge to reconsider. It's not fair to give the death penalty to some people but then take it away in a case like this without letting the trial judge take another look at it first.

A competency hearing is required only if "on the basis of the facts and circumstances known to the trial judge, there was or should have been a good faith doubt about the defendant's ability... to participate intelligently in the proceedings."

—recognizing that self-representation is not an absolute right and stating that "the court need not stop the trial for the convenience of the defendant each time he changes his mind

When faced with a claim of misconduct, we must determine whether "counsel's actions were `reasonably likely to have affected the jury's verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.'"Id

We will find fundamental error only "when it goes to the foundation of the case, takes from a defendant a right essential to the defense, or is of such magnitude that it cannot be said it is possible for the defendant to have had a fair trial."

The nature of the right to self-representation does not "suggest [] that the usual deference to `judgment calls'... by the trial judge should not obtain here. "

There is no constitutional or other right to hybrid representation, id., and whether to permit it "remains within the sound discretion of the trial judge."

Counsel have wide latitude to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence, but cannot make insinuations that have no evidentiary support.

A] defendant acting in propria persona is subject to the same rules as an attorney. "(citations omitted

I] t is uniformly held that all motions [for self-representation] made after jury selection has begun are untimely

—but this Court does not "reverse convictions merely to punish a prosecutor's misdeeds [] or to deter future misconduct,"

No, a prosecutor's improper suggestion that a defendant would be released if acquitted by reason of insanity does not constitute fundamental error when the defendant fails to properly object, the prejudicial effect is mitigated, and the evidence against the insanity defense is not persuasive. The prosecutor's questions about the consequences of an insanity verdict were improper because the disposition of a defendant is irrelevant to the jury's fact-finding role. However, Cornell failed to make a timely and proper objection, waiving the issue for appeal absent fundamental error. The court found the error was not fundamental because 1) the witness's answers were protective, refuting the prosecutor's premise and mentioning possible commitment to a state hospital; 2) the questioning was brief; and 3) the issue of release would likely have been on jurors' minds regardless, given the nature of a temporary insanity defense. Most importantly, the evidence supporting Cornell's insanity defense, based on a novel theory, was not persuasive and was effectively rebutted by the state's experts, meaning the misconduct was unlikely to have affected the verdict.

No, the prosecutor's misconduct did not require reversal of the conviction. While concurring in affirming the conviction, this opinion dissents on two points. First, the trial court does not have the discretion to permit 'hybrid representation'; a defendant either has counsel or proceeds pro se with advisory counsel, with no middle ground permitted under the rules. Second, the court erred by reducing Cornell's death sentence to life imprisonment. The proper procedure, after an aggravating factor is invalidated, is to remand the case to the trial judge for reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, not for the appellate court to arbitrarily reduce the sentence.

No. The trial court did not err in its handling of the defendant's waiver of counsel, the reading of the indictment, or the prosecutor's conduct. The defendant's waiver of counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The reading of the indictment to the jury was not error, and the prosecutor's conduct, while improper, did not constitute fundamental error affecting the defendant's fair trial rights. However, the death sentence cannot stand because it was based on an aggravating factor that no longer exists after the reversal of a prior conviction. The sentence is reduced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five years. The court also recognized that self-representation is not an absolute right and that the trial court has discretion in matters of hybrid representation and timeliness of motions for self-representation.

I concur in affirming the judgment of conviction, but do not agree that hybrid representation is permitted by our rules. If there is no right to hybrid representation, then the trial judge has no power to allow it. I dissent from the court's reduction of sentence without first giving the trial judge an opportunity to reweigh. When an aggravating circumstance is knocked out and reweighing on the record is undesirable because there exists the possibility of a more substantive mitigation hearing, we should remand to the trial judge for reweighing. It is arbitrary to impose the death sentence on others, and then, on a record like this, relieve a defendant of the death sentence without first giving the trial judge an opportunity to properly reweigh.

The STATE of Arizona v. Joe D. CORNELL

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