State v. Cornelius
448 N.W.2d 434, 1989 Wisc. App. LEXIS 900, 152 Wis. 2d 272 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
An individual is considered "born alive" for the purpose of Wisconsin's homicide statutes if, at birth, they do not meet the statutory criteria for death (irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem), thereby allowing homicide charges to proceed against a defendant whose actions caused fatal prenatal injuries to a fetus that is subsequently born alive and dies from those injuries.
Facts:
- On April 24, 1987, Maurice Cornelius spent most of the day drinking at various bars with his girlfriend, Sherry Wheelock, and other friends and family.
- An argument erupted between Cornelius and Wheelock, and she alleged that he forced her to go on a "death ride" with him.
- During this ride, the car left the road and struck a telephone pole, severely injuring its two occupants, and Cornelius was later found to have a blood alcohol level of .17%.
- At the time of the accident, Wheelock was approximately seven months pregnant with Cornelius' child.
- When Wheelock reached the hospital, doctors observed abdominal trauma and an abnormally low fetal heart rate, leading them to perform a cesarean section.
- The infant, named Robert Maurice Cornelius, was born very limp, pale, and in extremely poor condition due to the placenta detaching and depriving the fetus of oxygen, but he did have a heartbeat and was attempting to breathe.
- Robert was placed on artificial respiration and his condition improved somewhat, but a brain wave test the following day revealed no evidence of brain wave activity.
- Two days after the accident, Robert's heart and lungs failed, and he was pronounced dead.
Procedural Posture:
- Maurice Cornelius was charged in a trial court with homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle and homicide by the use of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of 0.1%, among other charges, based on his role in an automobile accident.
- Cornelius challenged the homicide charges and filed a motion requesting their dismissal.
- The trial court granted Cornelius' motion, dismissing the homicide charges, on the grounds that the complaint was insufficient and the evidence at the preliminary hearing did not support the charges, specifically finding that the fetus was not born alive or that, as a matter of law, no homicide had been committed.
- The State appealed the dismissal of the two counts of homicide to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does Wisconsin's homicide statute apply when a defendant's actions cause fatal injuries to a fetus in utero, and the infant is subsequently born alive, meeting the statutory definition of "alive" based on brain stem activity and circulatory/respiratory functions, but then dies from those prenatal injuries?
Opinions:
Majority - Cane, P. J.
Yes, Wisconsin's homicide statute applies when a defendant's actions cause fatal injuries to a fetus in utero, and the infant is subsequently born alive, meeting the statutory definition of "alive" based on brain stem activity and circulatory/respiratory functions, but then dies from those prenatal injuries. The court first addressed whether Robert was "born alive" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 939.22(16), which defines "human being" in the homicide statutes as "one who has been born alive." Since "born alive" is not defined, the court applied the criteria of Wis. Stat. § 146.71, which defines death as either irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem. The court reasoned that if one is not dead under this statute, they are alive. Robert was not dead under the first criterion because he had an independent heartbeat. He was also not dead under the second criterion because medical testimony indicated brain stem activity, despite the absence of higher-level brain function. The court held that the legislature determined brain stem activity is sufficient to indicate "life," and thus the trial court erred in finding the infant "brain dead." Next, the court found that the homicide statutes (§ 940.09(1)(a) and (b)), which require causing the death of "another," unambiguously apply. "Another" refers to a "human being," defined as "one who has been born alive." The statutes do not place limitations on the nature or timing of the cause of death; as long as the defendant caused the death of someone who was born alive, the charges are appropriate, with causation being a matter for trial. This interpretation aligns with the common-law "born alive" rule and harmonizes civil and criminal liability for prenatal injuries. The court clarified that its decision does not address abortion law but focuses solely on the rights of an individual born alive. The court declined to make its holding prospective only, finding it was not an unanticipated divergence from past law.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the legal definition of "born alive" in Wisconsin's homicide statutes by linking it directly to the state's statutory definition of death and emphasizing the sufficiency of brain stem activity, rather than higher brain function, for determining life. By upholding the application of homicide charges for prenatal injuries that lead to a subsequent live birth and death, the decision reinforces the long-standing common-law "born alive" rule and aligns Wisconsin with the majority of jurisdictions. This ruling has the potential to broaden the scope of criminal liability for actions causing harm to pregnant individuals, ensuring greater consistency between civil and criminal redress for prenatal harm and impacting how such cases are prosecuted in the future.
