State v. Conde
67 Conn. App. 474, 787 A.2d. 571, 2001 Conn. App. LEXIS 643 (2001)
Rule of Law:
A defendant may be liable as an accessory to a crime based on 'nonactions' or passive behavior, such as providing an assurance of non-interference, if that behavior is intended to aid the principal and successfully encourages or facilitates the commission of the offense.
Facts:
- The defendant, Martin Conde, was the president of the Nietas gang, which had a peace treaty and cooperative drug-dealing relationship with the Latin Kings gang.
- The victim, DeJesus, was a member of the Nietas who owed the defendant money and had recently disrespected a regional commander of the Latin Kings.
- Leaders of the Latin Kings met with the defendant at his home to discuss their grievances regarding DeJesus.
- During the meeting, the defendant expressed anger at the victim regarding the unpaid debt.
- The defendant told the Latin King leaders to 'Go ahead and kill him.'
- This statement served as an assurance that the Nietas would not retaliate or start a gang war if the Latin Kings carried out the murder.
- Following the meeting, members of the Latin Kings shot and killed DeJesus.
- The defendant later admitted to an associate that he and the Latin King leader had agreed 'to do Dejon' (the victim).
Procedural Posture:
- The State filed an information charging the defendant with conspiracy to commit murder and murder as an accessory.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial in the Superior Court.
- The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts.
- The trial court denied the defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal.
- The trial court rendered a judgment of conviction against the defendant.
- The defendant appealed the conviction to the Appellate Court of Connecticut.
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Issue:
Does a gang leader's verbal authorization of a murder and implied promise not to retaliate constitute 'intentional aid' sufficient for accessory liability, even in the absence of a legal duty to protect the victim?
Opinions:
Majority - Lavery, C. J.
Yes, a defendant acts as an accessory when he provides a meaningful assurance of non-interference that encourages the principal to commit the crime. The court reasoned that accessory liability under General Statutes § 53a-8 does not strictly require physical acts; 'intentional aid' can encompass passive behaviors when coupled with the intent that the crime occur. While 'mere presence' or 'passive acquiescence' is insufficient for liability, the defendant's conduct here went further. By telling the Latin Kings to proceed, he used his authority as gang president to remove a significant deterrent—the threat of a gang war. This authorization was a 'positive act' of counsel and an assurance of safety for the perpetrators, thereby intentionally aiding the murder.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of accessory liability regarding 'nonactions.' It distinguishes between a bystander who simply fails to intervene (typically not liable without a legal duty) and a person of authority whose calculated passivity or assurance of non-interference actively facilitates the crime. The ruling establishes that 'intentional aid' is a broad concept that includes psychological encouragement and the removal of barriers to the crime, such as the threat of retaliation. This creates a precedent that leaders of criminal organizations can be held liable for the acts of others even if their contribution is granting permission rather than physical participation.
