State v. Coen
2012 WL 1392577, 2012 Mo. App. LEXIS 577, 364 S.W.3d 767 (2012)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The affirmative defense of duress requires proof of a present, imminent, and impending threat of unlawful physical force that induces a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury, such that a person of reasonable firmness would be unable to resist, and the defendant must not have recklessly placed himself in the situation or had a reasonable opportunity to avoid the criminal act.
Facts:
- On June 26, 2009, Cynthia Creek saw two men wearing bandanas over their faces and oversized white shirts exit a car and enter The Shoe Department in Harrisonville, Missouri, prompting her to call the police.
- Inside the store, Robin Lee and Rachel Ephland, the assistant manager, heard one of the men yell to 'Get down on the effing floor,' with one man pumping a baseball bat toward Lee's face and the other holding a crowbar.
- Christopher Coen, wearing a red bandana, sunglasses, and a white shirt, jumped over the counter and grabbed the cash register while the other man, Dustin Miller, carried the bat.
- Coen and Miller ran out of the store, and Creek observed Coen struggling to put the cash register into Miller's car before they sped off, allowing her to write down the license plate number.
- Miller was later arrested after a police pursuit during which items (bandanas, bat) were thrown from his car; Coen was identified by an informant and turned himself in on July 8, 2009.
- During an interview, Coen admitted to Detective Belk that he had discussed the robbery plan with Miller several times due to his own financial problems, agreed to commit the robbery on June 24, and voluntarily met Miller on June 26 for the robbery, after which he split $700 with Miller and used his share for personal debts.
- Joshua Sidwell testified for the defense that Miller bullied Coen by punching, pushing, or kicking him, but admitted Miller never threatened Coen with a weapon or directly threatened him regarding The Shoe Department robbery.
- Coen testified that Miller 'forced me to do it' due to the bullying history, making him feel his life was in danger and he would face a physical altercation if he refused, but also admitted Miller never threatened him with a weapon (instead, Coen accepted a tire iron from Miller) and that he had many opportunities to run away.
- Coen voluntarily accompanied Miller to Wal-Mart to buy bandanas and gloves for the robbery, accepted a tire iron from Miller as a weapon in the parking lot, and after the robbery, accepted half of the stolen money, which he used to pay a fine, rent, and a debt.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Missouri charged Christopher Coen in the Circuit Court of Cass County, Missouri, with first-degree robbery and armed criminal action.
- Coen raised the defense of duress at trial and proffered jury instructions for it.
- The trial court refused to submit Coen's duress instructions to the jury.
- The jury found Christopher Coen guilty of both first-degree robbery and armed criminal action.
- The trial court sentenced Coen to consecutive terms of ten years' imprisonment for first-degree robbery and three years' imprisonment for armed criminal action.
- Christopher Coen (appellant) appealed his convictions to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, arguing the trial court erred in refusing his proffered jury instruction on duress.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to submit a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of duress when the defendant claimed he was coerced into committing a robbery due to a history of bullying, but voluntarily placed himself in the situation and had opportunities to avoid the crime?
Opinions:
Majority - Mark D. Pfeiffer
No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to submit a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of duress because the evidence presented by Christopher Coen did not meet the stringent requirements of the duress statute. The court explained that, for duress to be a valid defense, the coercion must be present, imminent, and impending, inducing a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury, and a person of reasonable firmness in the defendant's situation would have been unable to resist. Furthermore, the defense is unavailable if the defendant recklessly places himself in the situation or has a reasonable opportunity to avoid the act. In Coen's case, the evidence showed no imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury from Miller; rather, Miller equipped Coen with a weapon (a crowbar) and made assurances that "[i]t will be all right. Everything will be fine." Coen also recklessly placed himself in the situation by voluntarily meeting Miller, going to Wal-Mart to buy robbery supplies, and accepting a weapon, despite knowing Miller's bullying history and plans for the robbery. Moreover, Coen had numerous reasonable opportunities to avoid participation, but chose to proceed, participate, and then benefit financially from the crime. The court distinguished this case from `State v. Crenshaw`, where the defendant was under immediate surveillance with a gun pointed at him, highlighting the lack of a similar immediate, lethal threat against Coen.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the high threshold for successfully asserting the affirmative defense of duress in Missouri. It clarifies that merely feeling threatened due to a history of bullying is insufficient without an imminent, unavoidable threat of severe physical harm. The ruling emphasizes a defendant's own agency, holding that actively and voluntarily participating in steps leading to a crime, or failing to seize opportunities to escape, undermines a duress claim. Future cases will likely scrutinize evidence of an 'imminent' threat and a defendant's 'reckless placement' in a dangerous situation, making it challenging to establish duress when the defendant has any degree of complicity or perceived choice.
