State v. Coates
1993 La. App. LEXIS 2495, 622 So. 2d 268, 1993 WL 254931 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of a physical struggle, even without visible injury, can satisfy the battery element for aggravated burglary. Furthermore, prosecutorial comments or questions regarding a defendant's failure to request a lineup or reference to a court-appointed attorney do not constitute reversible error if they do not shift the burden of proof, violate self-incrimination, or are promptly admonished by the trial judge, and are not shown to be prejudicial to the jury's verdict.
Facts:
- On September 15, 1991, at approximately 6:45 a.m., Michael Coates broke the rear glass door of Michael Suggs' residence and entered the home.
- Michael Suggs heard the noise, left his bedroom, and encountered Michael Coates in a hallway.
- Michael Coates lunged at Suggs, and they struggled in the hallway, striking at each other.
- The struggle caused damage to Suggs' home, including a hole in the wall and a broken glass display stand.
- Coates broke free from Suggs and ran from the home.
- Irvin Cook, Suggs' neighbor, heard a loud noise, looked out his window, and saw Coates kick in the rear door and enter Suggs' residence.
- Irvin Cook recognized Michael Coates, a man he had previously lived near.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael Coates was charged with aggravated burglary in the 24th Judicial District.
- A jury convicted Michael Coates of aggravated burglary.
- Michael Coates was sentenced to 12 years at hard labor, with credit for time served.
- The State dismissed a multiple offender bill that had been filed against Coates.
- Coates appealed his conviction and sentence to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, raising three assignments of error.
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Issue:
1. Does a brief physical struggle resulting in property damage but no visible injury constitute a battery sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated burglary under LSA-R.S. 14:60? 2. Did the prosecutor's questioning of a police officer about Michael Coates' failure to request a lineup, and subsequent argument about it, improperly shift the burden of proof or violate Coates' right against self-incrimination? 3. Did the prosecutor's statement during closing arguments that Michael Coates had a court-appointed attorney warrant a mistrial, given that the trial judge admonished the jury to disregard the comment?
Opinions:
Majority - Gaudin, Judge
Yes, a brief physical struggle causing property damage, even without visible injury, constitutes a battery sufficient for aggravated burglary. LSA-R.S. 14:60 defines aggravated burglary to include committing a battery, and LSA-R.S. 14:33 describes a battery as the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another. Suggs' uncontested testimony described a struggle where he struck Coates and Coates lunged toward him, causing a hole in the wall and a broken glass display stand. The court found this clearly demonstrated Coates used force or violence in the physical encounter, allowing the jury to infer a battery. No, the prosecutor's questioning and argument regarding Coates' failure to request a lineup did not improperly shift the burden of proof or violate his right against self-incrimination. The prosecutor's questions were in response to defense counsel's cross-examination about the absence of a lineup. There was no indication that these questions shifted the burden of proof to Coates, nor did they compel him to furnish testimonial or communicative evidence, which is protected by the privilege against self-incrimination (citing Gilbert v. California, Schmerber v. California). The brief comments were not shown to have influenced the jury or contributed to the guilty verdict, which is necessary for reversal. No, the prosecutor's reference to Coates having a court-appointed attorney did not warrant a mistrial. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 770 mandates a mistrial for references to race, other crimes, or failure to testify, but not for comments on indigency. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 771 allows for an admonition to the jury or a discretionary mistrial for other potentially prejudicial remarks. The trial judge immediately admonished the jury to disregard the comment, reminding them that attorneys' statements are not evidence and that the defendant's ability to afford counsel is irrelevant. Granting a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and prejudice must be shown. The court found no prejudice, particularly given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, and noted the remarks were not references to Coates' employment, economic status, or race, but were in rebuttal to defense statements.
Analysis:
This case reinforces a broad interpretation of "battery" for aggravated burglary in Louisiana, establishing that a physical struggle, even if brief and without visible injury to the victim, can satisfy the element if force or violence is used. It delineates the permissible scope of prosecutorial questioning and argument when responding to defense inquiries about the absence of a lineup, clarifying that such responses do not automatically shift the burden of proof or violate self-incrimination rights. Furthermore, the decision underscores the significant discretion of trial judges in managing potentially prejudicial prosecutorial remarks regarding a defendant's indigence, affirming that a prompt jury admonition can often mitigate any harm, thereby avoiding a mandatory mistrial unless substantial prejudice is demonstrably shown.
