State v. Clifford
502 P.2d 1371, 1972 Ore. LEXIS 420, 263 Or. 436 (1972)
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Rule of Law:
To be convicted as an accessory after the fact, a person must commit an affirmative act intended to help a felon avoid apprehension or punishment. A mere false denial of knowledge regarding the felon's past whereabouts, without additional evidence of intent to aid the felon's escape, is insufficient to constitute the crime.
Facts:
- On September 1 or 2, 1969, Douglas Wright killed Gail Snelling and Margaret Rosenberry and kidnapped Mrs. Snelling's five-year-old son.
- On the night of September 3, Wright visited the petitioner, Clifford, at his home.
- On the evening of September 4, Clifford learned from a television news program that Wright was wanted for the murders.
- On September 5, two police detectives came to Clifford's home and asked him if he had seen Wright and the boy.
- Clifford falsely replied that he had not seen them or that he had not seen Wright for a long time.
Procedural Posture:
- Clifford was convicted in the Circuit Court (trial court) as an accessory after the fact.
- Clifford appealed the conviction to the Oregon Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conviction.
- The Oregon Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
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Issue:
Does a person's false denial to police of having recently seen a known felon constitute 'aiding' the offender sufficient for a conviction as an accessory after the fact under Oregon law?
Opinions:
Majority - McAllister, j.
No, a person's false denial to police of having recently seen a known felon does not, by itself, constitute 'aiding' the offender sufficient for a conviction as an accessory after the fact. The court reasoned that the statute for being an accessory after the fact codifies the common-law offense, which requires an affirmative act of assistance to the felon. Citing historical authorities like Blackstone, the court noted that classic examples of accessorial conduct include providing a felon with a horse, money, shelter, or tools to escape—acts where the intent to aid is obvious. A mere false denial of knowledge about a felon's past whereabouts is not such an affirmative act. The court distinguished this from providing a false alibi, which is an affirmative act. Where the act is simply a lie that could be motivated by self-interest, the prosecution must present additional evidence that the lie was told with the specific intent to help the offender and was likely to do so. In this case, there was no such evidence, so Clifford's lie was insufficient to support his conviction.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies and narrows the scope of conduct that can lead to a conviction for being an accessory after the fact. It establishes a clear distinction between passive non-cooperation or misinformation (like a simple denial) and active, affirmative assistance to a felon. By requiring proof of specific intent to aid the offender when the act itself is not inherently helpful, the ruling protects individuals from felony convictions for lies that may be motivated by fear, self-preservation, or a desire not to get involved, rather than a genuine intent to help a criminal evade justice. This precedent requires courts to scrutinize not just the falsehood of a statement, but its character and the specific intent behind it.
