State v. Cleere
138 P.3d 1181, 473 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 3, 213 Ariz. 54 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Sixth Amendment, once a single aggravating sentencing factor is properly established—either by jury finding, defendant's admission, or as harmless error where no reasonable jury could disagree—a judge has the discretion to consider additional judge-found facts to determine the specific sentence within the statutorily authorized aggravated range.
Facts:
- Fredric Cleere was indicted in connection with an armed robbery.
- During the incident, Cleere used a box cutter to slit a victim's throat.
- The victim's cut extended from ear to ear, exposing the trachea.
- Cleere committed the offense with the motive of pecuniary gain.
- As a result of the attack, the victim sustained very serious physical injuries and suffered serious emotional and mental harm.
Procedural Posture:
- Fredric Cleere pled guilty to attempted murder in trial court in March 2001 and received a fifteen-year prison sentence.
- Cleere successfully sought post-conviction relief on the ground that the court improperly used a single fact for two sentencing purposes, and his sentence was vacated.
- At a resentencing hearing in September 2002, the trial court again imposed a fifteen-year sentence, finding four distinct aggravating factors.
- Cleere filed a second petition for post-conviction relief challenging the new sentence, which the trial court denied except for vacating a monetary surcharge.
- Cleere filed this petition for review in the Court of Appeals, challenging the denial of his second post-conviction relief petition.
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Issue:
Does a trial court violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, as interpreted in Blakely v. Washington, by imposing an aggravated sentence based on multiple judge-found facts, when at least one of those factors is not an essential element of the offense and is supported by such overwhelming evidence that its finding by a judge constitutes harmless error?
Opinions:
Majority - Pelander, Chief Judge
No, the trial court does not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. The infliction of serious physical injury is not an essential element of attempted murder under Arizona law and can therefore be used as an aggravating factor. Furthermore, once a single, constitutionally permissible aggravating factor makes a defendant eligible for an aggravated sentence, the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a judge then considers other judge-found factors in exercising discretion to set a specific sentence within the aggravated range. The court reasoned that serious physical injury is not a required element of attempted murder, which only necessitates intent and an overt act. Therefore, it was a permissible aggravating factor under state statute. Addressing the Sixth Amendment challenge under Blakely, the court applied the harmless error analysis from State v. Henderson. It concluded that no reasonable jury could have failed to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Cleere inflicted serious physical injury by slitting the victim's throat. Because this single aggravating factor was established as harmless error, it was sufficient to make Cleere eligible for an aggravated sentence. Consequently, the trial judge could then properly consider the other aggravating factors (cruelty, pecuniary gain, emotional harm) to determine the length of the sentence within that enhanced range without needing a jury to find those additional facts.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the practical application of Blakely v. Washington in Arizona, effectively creating a 'gateway' approach to aggravated sentencing. It establishes the principle that as long as one aggravating factor is constitutionally sound (admitted, jury-found, or harmlessly found by a judge), the defendant's maximum sentence is legally raised, allowing the judge to resume their traditional role in weighing various factors to impose a sentence within the newly authorized range. This holding limits Blakely's reach in cases with at least one undeniable aggravating circumstance, preserving judicial discretion in sentencing once the jury-trial right is satisfied by a single threshold finding. This framework makes it more difficult for defendants to succeed on Blakely challenges if any single aggravator is supported by overwhelming evidence.
