State v. Clark
1994 WL 541611, 643 So. 2d 463 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant is not entitled to a manslaughter verdict based on a 'sudden passion' or 'heat of blood' defense when there is a significant cooling-off period, such as two weeks, between the provocation and the homicide.
Facts:
- Alvin Clark developed a relationship with Leary Joseph while serving a parish jail sentence.
- Shortly after Clark's release, he received approximately $1,600 in social security checks.
- Clark and Joseph went to a motel, where Joseph took Clark's money after he fell asleep and then left.
- When Clark demanded his money back, Joseph told him she had given it to her boyfriend, and she subsequently changed her phone number.
- Approximately two weeks later, Clark told his niece and a local police officer that he was going to shoot someone.
- On the same day, Clark had a friend, Roland Richard, purchase a pistol for him at a pawn shop.
- Clark went to Joseph's home, saw her through a window, and shot her.
- Joseph died the following day from the gunshot wound.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Louisiana charged Alvin Clark by grand jury indictment with second-degree murder.
- Clark initially entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
- A sanity commission determined Clark was competent to stand trial and was sane at the time of the offense.
- On the day of trial, Clark withdrew his insanity plea and entered a plea of not guilty.
- A jury in the trial court found Clark guilty of second-degree murder.
- The trial court sentenced Clark to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, and ordered him to pay $2,000 in restitution.
- Clark appealed his conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Does sufficient evidence support a conviction for second-degree murder, which requires specific intent to kill, when the defendant claims provocation but there was a two-week period between the provoking act and the homicide?
Opinions:
Majority - Cooks, J.
Yes, the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for second-degree murder. The state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Clark had the specific intent to kill, and his claim of provocation was negated by the significant cooling-off period. To convict for second-degree murder, the state must prove the offender had a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. This intent can be inferred from the defendant's actions and the circumstances. Clark's statements to his niece and a police officer that he intended to shoot someone, his act of procuring a pistol, and the act of aiming and firing the weapon at the victim all demonstrate specific intent. While Clark argued for a manslaughter verdict due to provocation, manslaughter requires the offense to be committed in 'sudden passion' or 'heat of blood.' These are mitigatory factors that the defendant must prove. Provocation does not reduce murder to manslaughter if an average person's blood would have cooled by the time of the offense. Here, approximately two weeks passed between the provocation (the theft) and the homicide. Clark himself testified he decided to shoot Joseph on the day she took his money. This extended time frame was more than sufficient for his blood to cool, negating the 'sudden passion' defense and allowing a rational jury to find him guilty of second-degree murder.
Analysis:
This case serves as a clear illustration of the limitations of the 'heat of blood' or 'sudden passion' defense used to mitigate a murder charge to manslaughter. The court's analysis emphasizes that the passage of time is a critical factor in determining whether a defendant acted impulsively or with premeditated intent. By holding that a two-week 'cooling-off' period is sufficient to negate a provocation defense, the decision reinforces the objective 'average person' standard in this area of criminal law. This precedent clarifies for future cases that a defendant's subjective feelings of anger or frustration are insufficient if a reasonable amount of time has elapsed, during which the law expects self-control to be regained.
