State v. Chew
2014 WI App 116, 856 N.W.2d 541, 358 Wis. 2d 368 (2014)
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Rule of Law:
Wisconsin's castle doctrine, which presumes the use of force is justified against an intruder, does not apply when the force is used against an intruder who has already fled the actor's dwelling and is in a shared common area.
Facts:
- Charles Chew lived in an apartment that he had shared with his former girlfriend, Cheryl McCranie.
- McCranie returned to the apartment with her new boyfriend, Andrew Lee, and his friend, Andreaius Lucas, to retrieve some clothes.
- Lee and Lucas entered Chew's apartment and physically attacked him.
- During the attack inside the apartment, Chew fired a gun, wounding both Lee and Lucas in the leg.
- Lee and Lucas fled the apartment and ran out into the shared parking lot of the apartment complex.
- From the doorway of the apartment building, Chew fired more shots at Lee and Lucas as they were fleeing through the parking lot.
- The shots fired into the parking lot missed Lee and Lucas but struck a nearby inn and a car.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Charles Chew in trial court with recklessly endangering safety, based on the shots he fired into the parking lot.
- Prior to trial, Chew requested a jury instruction on the castle doctrine, which the trial court denied.
- The trial court provided a general self-defense instruction to the jury.
- A jury found Chew guilty of the charge.
- Chew, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, challenging the trial court's refusal to give the castle doctrine instruction.
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Issue:
Does Wisconsin's castle doctrine statute, Wis. Stat. § 939.48(lm), which provides a presumption of reasonableness for force used against a person 'in the actor's dwelling,' apply when the defendant fires shots at intruders who have already exited his apartment and are fleeing across a shared apartment complex parking lot?
Opinions:
Majority - Neubauer, P.J.
No. The castle doctrine does not apply because the statutory presumption of reasonableness for the use of force is limited to situations where the target is physically 'in the actor's dwelling' at the moment the force is used. The statute defines 'dwelling' to include areas over which the resident has exclusive control, such as private driveways or patios. A shared apartment complex parking lot is not exclusive to any single tenant and therefore does not qualify as part of Chew's dwelling. Because Lee and Lucas were in the shared parking lot and no longer in Chew's apartment when he fired the shots at issue, Chew was not entitled to a jury instruction under the castle doctrine statute.
Analysis:
This decision narrowly construes the spatial limits of Wisconsin's castle doctrine, establishing that its protections do not extend to common areas of multi-unit housing. The ruling clarifies that the doctrine's powerful presumption of justified force ceases the moment an intruder exits the defined 'dwelling.' This forces defendants who use force in common areas like shared parking lots or hallways to rely on traditional self-defense principles, which may include a duty to retreat. The case sets a precedent that the 'castle' is confined to areas of exclusive control, significantly limiting the doctrine's applicability for apartment dwellers and others in similar shared-living situations.
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