State v. Cazares-Mendez/Reyes-Sanchez
350 Or. 491, 256 P.3d 104, 2011 Ore. LEXIS 569 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal defendant's due process rights are violated when a state evidentiary rule mechanistically excludes trustworthy hearsay evidence that another person confessed to the crime, particularly when the declarant is available to testify and subject to cross-examination. For hearsay exceptions requiring 'trustworthiness,' courts must assess the reliability of the declarant's statement itself, not the credibility of the witness testifying to the statement.
Facts:
- On March 17, 2005, Jessie Valero was found dead in her Hillsboro apartment, having died from approximately 29 stab wounds.
- An unfamiliar red bicycle was found in Valero's apartment, and the contents of her jewelry box were emptied on the bed, suggesting a burglary.
- José Lugardo-Madero testified that on March 15, 2005, he, Jose Guadalupe Cazares-Mendez, and Jorge Reyes-Sanchez went to Valero's apartment complex with the intent to break in and steal jewelry, with Reyes-Sanchez having the red bicycle.
- Lugardo-Madero stated he waited outside, heard noises, and fled, and that Cazares-Mendez later arrived at his apartment, washed clothes, and bathed, followed approximately two hours later by Reyes-Sanchez.
- About a week later, Cazares-Mendez admitted to Lugardo-Madero that he and Reyes-Sanchez had murdered Valero and threatened Lugardo-Madero to keep silent.
- Tiffany Scherer, an acquaintance of Valero's, confessed to Connie Torres that she had stabbed a woman, couldn't stop, and attempted to make it look like a burglary.
- Scherer separately told Naomi Rivera that she stabbed a 'bitch' repeatedly, told Jessica Callahan she was hiding from police for stabbing a lady, and told Lisa Ann Smith that she stabbed Valero about 22 times, mentioned Valero had a seizure during the attack (Valero had epilepsy), and sent someone back to rob the place.
- Benilde Torres observed an inch-long scratch on Scherer's neck shortly after Valero's death, which Scherer claimed was a hickey but did not appear to be one to Torres.
Procedural Posture:
- Jose Guadalupe Cazares-Mendez and Jorge Reyes-Sanchez were indicted in Washington County Circuit Court for aggravated murder, murder, first-degree robbery, and first-degree burglary.
- Defendant Reyes-Sanchez was tried first in Washington County Circuit Court, followed shortly afterward by defendant Cazares-Mendez, before the same trial judge.
- During both trials, the circuit court refused to allow defendants to present hearsay evidence from four witnesses that Tiffany Scherer had confessed to the murder.
- At the conclusion of each trial, each defendant was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
- Both defendants appealed their convictions to the Oregon Court of Appeals.
- The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed both convictions (appellant Cazares-Mendez and appellant Reyes-Sanchez against appellee State of Oregon), holding that the trial court erred in excluding the hearsay testimony, finding it met the trustworthiness requirement of OEC 804(3)(c) and that due process (under Chambers v. Mississippi) required its admission despite Scherer's availability (in Cazares-Mendez).
- In Reyes-Sanchez, the Court of Appeals concluded the exclusion was plain error given the identical legal and factual issues with Cazares-Mendez and to prevent fundamental unfairness.
- The State of Oregon, as petitioner on review, sought review from the Oregon Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require the admission of trustworthy hearsay statements confessing to a crime, even if state evidentiary rules (like the statement against penal interest exception or residual hearsay exception) would otherwise exclude them due to the declarant's availability or by misapplying trustworthiness standards?
Opinions:
Majority - Balmer, J.
Yes, the Due Process Clause requires the admission of trustworthy hearsay statements confessing to a crime when those statements are critical to the defense, even if state evidentiary rules would normally exclude them due to the declarant's availability or by misapplying trustworthiness standards. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, finding that the trial court erred by excluding hearsay statements where another person, Tiffany Scherer, confessed to the murder. The court emphasized that the relevant 'trustworthiness' in hearsay exceptions, like OEC 804(3)(c) (statement against penal interest) and OEC 803(28)(a) (residual hearsay), refers to the reliability of the declarant's statement, not the credibility of the witness testifying about the statement. Citing Sheedy v. Stall and State v. Mendez, the court reiterated that witness credibility is for the jury. The trial court's consideration of factors like witness delay in reporting, methamphetamine use, or Scherer's denial of the statements was deemed irrelevant to the admissibility determination. The court found that the corroborating circumstances, such as Scherer confessing on four separate occasions to four different witnesses with consistent and specific details (e.g., repeated stabbing, making it look like a burglary, Valero having a seizure during the attack while having epilepsy), clearly indicated the trustworthiness of Scherer's statements. While OEC 804(3)(c) requires the declarant to be unavailable, the court held that the Due Process Clause, as interpreted in Chambers v. Mississippi and Holmes v. South Carolina, supersedes this requirement when the evidence is trustworthy and critical to the defense. The unavailability requirement was deemed arbitrary and disproportionate because an available declarant could clarify or refute the confession, making the evidence more reliable, not less. For Reyes-Sanchez, the court found the residual hearsay exception (OEC 803(28)(a)) inapplicable because the evidence fell under a more specific exception (statement against penal interest), which State v. Campbell established as precluding the use of the residual exception. However, due process considerations from Chambers still applied, requiring admission of the evidence.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of hearsay exceptions in Oregon, particularly regarding 'trustworthiness' and the constitutional mandate of due process under Chambers v. Mississippi. It firmly establishes that courts must focus on the inherent reliability of the declarant's statement, not the relating witness's credibility, when assessing trustworthiness for admissibility. Furthermore, it reinforces that state evidentiary rules cannot mechanistically exclude critical, trustworthy defense evidence, especially confessions by third parties, even if the declarant is available to testify, as such an exclusion would violate a defendant's right to present a complete defense. This ruling will likely lead to closer scrutiny of trial court decisions to exclude third-party confessions and may expand the circumstances under which such evidence must be admitted in Oregon courts.
