State v. Casey
2003 UT 33, 82 P.3d 1106, 488 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
A conviction for attempted murder requires proof that the defendant acted with the specific intent to cause the death of another; proof of a 'knowing' mental state is insufficient.
Facts:
- Michael Shawn Casey and his girlfriend, Tresa Franz, were drinking with a friend, Terron Allred.
- While intoxicated, Casey became belligerent, argued with Franz, and threatened to kill her.
- After arriving at a friend's house, Casey retrieved a handgun from a bag in the vehicle.
- Casey pointed the gun at Franz's neck and made a threatening statement.
- After Franz briefly left and returned to the car, Casey began to drive away.
- While driving, Casey pointed the handgun at Franz's head and pulled the trigger, but the gun misfired.
- Casey then pointed the gun at Franz's feet and successfully fired a round into the floor of the vehicle.
- Casey pointed the gun at Franz's head a second time; Franz pushed his arm away and jumped out of the moving vehicle as Casey fired again.
Procedural Posture:
- A jury in the trial court convicted Michael Shawn Casey of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and domestic violence.
- After his conviction, Casey's new counsel filed a motion to vacate the convictions, arguing for the first time that the jury instruction for attempted murder was improper.
- The trial court treated the motion as one for a new trial and denied it.
- Casey (appellant) appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court).
- The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that prior precedent permitted an attempted murder conviction based on a 'knowing' mental state.
- Casey (petitioner) then successfully petitioned the Utah Supreme Court (highest court) for a writ of certiorari on the issue of the required mental state.
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Issue:
Does a conviction for attempted murder require proof that the defendant acted with the specific intent to kill, or is proof that the defendant acted knowingly sufficient under Utah law?
Opinions:
Majority - Associate Chief Justice Durrant
Yes, a conviction for attempted murder requires proof that the defendant acted with the specific intent to kill. The Utah attempt statute requires that the defendant's conduct constitute a substantial step that is 'strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense.' The court reasoned that this statutory language limits attempt liability to crimes committed with a specific intent, or 'conscious objective or desire,' to bring about the criminal result. The court distinguished Utah's statute from the Model Penal Code, which allows for attempt liability based on a 'knowing' mental state, noting the Utah legislature deliberately chose the more restrictive term 'intent.' The court also clarified and overruled its prior conflicting precedents in State v. Maestas and a footnote in State v. Vigil, bringing the rule for attempted murder in line with its prior holdings on other forms of attempted homicide which consistently required intent to kill. Although the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could convict Casey for attempted murder based on a knowing mental state, the court affirmed the conviction under the plain error doctrine, finding the error was not obvious due to confusing precedent and was not harmful because the evidence of Casey's intent to kill was overwhelming.
Analysis:
This decision resolves a significant point of confusion in Utah criminal law regarding the mens rea for attempt crimes, particularly attempted murder. By establishing that 'intent to kill' is a mandatory element, the court elevates the culpability requirement for attempted murder above that for certain types of completed murder, which can be sustained on a 'knowing' mens rea. This ruling clarifies conflicting precedent and will require prosecutors in future attempted murder cases to prove that the defendant's conscious objective was to cause death, not merely that the defendant was aware their conduct was reasonably certain to do so. The decision solidifies the principle that the crime of attempt is one of specific intent.
