State v. Carter
664 So.2d 367, 1995 WL 698037 (1995)
Rule of Law:
Where a defendant's Sixth Amendment and state constitutional right to counsel has attached, but the defendant has not asserted or invoked that right, the defendant may validly waive their right to counsel during a police-initiated interrogation if the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Facts:
- On February 10, 1994, Oscar Carter was arrested pursuant to a warrant for rape and battery.
- On February 11, 1994, Carter appeared in Magistrate Court for the Parish of Orleans for an initial appearance, where bond was set.
- During this initial appearance, the judge appointed the public defender to represent Carter because he could not make bail.
- On February 13, 1994, Officer Dickerson met with Carter in jail.
- Officer Dickerson advised Carter of his rights and asked if he wanted to make a statement.
- Carter affirmed that he understood his rights, stated he wanted to make a statement, and signed a "Rights of Arrestee Waiver Form."
- Carter thereafter made a statement to Officer Dickerson.
Procedural Posture:
- Oscar Carter filed a motion to suppress his statement in the trial court.
- The trial court denied Carter's motion to suppress the statement.
- Carter sought a writ application from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, which was granted.
- The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal summarily reversed the trial court's ruling, finding a violation of Carter's constitutional right to counsel under State v. Hattaway, and ordered the confession suppressed.
- The State of Louisiana then granted a writ application to the Supreme Court of Louisiana seeking review of the Fourth Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's Sixth Amendment and Louisiana Constitution Article I, Section 13 right to counsel prevent police from interrogating him and obtaining a valid waiver of that right after counsel has been appointed, if the defendant has not affirmatively asserted or invoked his right to counsel?
Opinions:
Majority - Kimball, Justice
No, a defendant's constitutional right to counsel does not prevent police interrogation or a valid waiver after counsel appointment, provided the defendant has not affirmatively asserted or invoked that right. The court holds that the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution are coextensive in their scope, operation, and application regarding attachment, applicability to stages, and waiver. The court overrules State v. Hattaway to the extent it held a per se invalidity of waivers once counsel is appointed, as Hattaway's interpretation of federal law was based on a misapprehension of the distinction between covert and overt interrogation. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches upon the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings (e.g., formal charge, indictment) and applies to "critical stages," which include post-attachment interrogation. However, the ability to waive this right depends on whether the defendant has asserted or invoked their right to counsel. Cases involving covert interrogation (e.g., Massiah v. United States) do not involve waiver because the defendant is unaware of speaking to a government agent. In overt interrogation cases, a defendant can validly waive their Sixth Amendment right to counsel if the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The prophylactic rule established in Michigan v. Jackson creates an irrebuttable presumption against waiver only when police initiate interrogation after a defendant has "asserted" or "invoked" their right to counsel. Simple appointment of counsel, without an affirmative request or assertion by the defendant, does not trigger this heightened protection. When the prophylactic rule does not apply, the traditional "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" standard from Patterson v. Illinois governs. This standard requires the state to prove that the defendant was sufficiently aware of their right to have counsel present during questioning and the potential consequences of proceeding without counsel. The provision of Miranda warnings generally satisfies the "knowing and intelligent" aspects for interrogation waivers. Applying this to Oscar Carter's case, the court assumes, arguendo, that Carter's right to counsel attached at his initial appearance. However, the record of Carter's initial appearance shows only that he indicated he could not afford an attorney and the judge appointed a public defender; there was no affirmative statement or action by Carter requesting counsel or indicating a desire to deal with police only through counsel. Therefore, Carter did not "assert" or "invoke" his right to counsel, meaning the Michigan v. Jackson prophylactic rule does not apply. The court then found that Carter's subsequent waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because Officer Dickerson advised him of his Miranda rights, he stated he understood them, signed a waiver form, and there was no evidence of coercion. Thus, his statements are admissible.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies and narrows the application of the right to counsel in Louisiana, aligning it more closely with federal Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. By partially overruling State v. Hattaway, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected a broader state constitutional protection against uncounseled interrogation. The ruling emphasizes the distinction between mere appointment of counsel and an affirmative invocation of the right to counsel, making it easier for police to obtain valid waivers during overt interrogations if a defendant does not explicitly ask for a lawyer. This decision places a higher burden on defendants to clearly assert their right to counsel to receive the heightened protections of Michigan v. Jackson.
