State v. Carson
1997 WL 469762, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 508, 950 S.W.2d 951 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Under Tennessee law, a person who aids and abets the commission of a criminal offense is also criminally responsible for any other crime committed by their confederate that is a natural and probable consequence of the originally planned offense.
Facts:
- Jubal Carson met with co-defendants Aaron Gary and Alton Stover to plan a robbery of 'Jim and Dave’s TV Repair' store.
- Carson, who had previously been in the store, described its layout and told his co-defendants where a large sum of money could be found.
- Carson provided a handgun to both Gary and Stover.
- The three men drove to the store, and Carson waited in the car while Gary and Stover went inside.
- Inside, Gary and Stover held two employees, James Adams and Dave McGaha, at gunpoint and stole $130 from Adams.
- After binding the employees with a telephone cord, Gary and Stover closed the office door and fired three shots through it, narrowly missing the victims.
- When Gary and Stover exited the store, Carson was gone; they then fled on foot and exchanged gunfire with police officers.
- Unbeknownst to the perpetrators, the store was an undercover police sting operation.
Procedural Posture:
- Jubal Carson was charged along with his co-defendants, Gary and Stover.
- The co-defendants pled guilty and testified against Carson at his trial in a Tennessee trial court.
- A jury convicted Carson of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and felony reckless endangerment.
- Carson, as appellant, appealed the convictions to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court, the state's highest court, granted Carson's appeal.
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Issue:
Does Tennessee's criminal responsibility statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402(2), hold a person who aids and abets a planned robbery criminally responsible for additional, unplanned offenses, such as assault and reckless endangerment, committed by their accomplices as a natural and probable consequence of that robbery?
Opinions:
Majority - Anderson, J.
Yes. A person who aids and abets a planned crime is also criminally responsible for other unplanned offenses committed by their accomplices if those offenses are a natural and probable consequence of the initial crime. The court reasoned that the Tennessee legislature, in enacting the 1989 criminal code, intended to incorporate established common law principles of accomplice liability. The court cited the common law 'natural and probable consequence' doctrine, previously articulated in Tennessee cases like Key v. State, which holds that if two people join to commit a crime, each is guilty of any other crime committed by their confederate in pursuance of the common purpose. Here, Carson initiated an armed robbery and supplied the weapons. The court found that the aggravated assaults against the store employees and the reckless endangerment that occurred during the escape were foreseeable, natural, and probable consequences of the armed robbery he planned and aided. Therefore, even though Carson did not personally commit the assaults or endangerment, he is criminally responsible for them.
Analysis:
This decision formally integrates the common law 'natural and probable consequence' doctrine into Tennessee's statutory framework for accomplice liability. It clarifies that an accomplice's criminal responsibility is not limited to the specific crime they intended to assist. Instead, liability extends to any other foreseeable crimes that result from the criminal enterprise, significantly broadening the scope of culpability for individuals involved in group criminal activity. This precedent makes it easier for prosecutors to convict accomplices for a wider range of offenses committed by their partners, even without proof that the accomplice shared the specific intent for those secondary crimes.
