State v. Carr
761 So.2d 1271, 2000 WL 681017 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
When a criminal statute is ambiguous regarding its scope, the rule of lenity requires that it be strictly construed in favor of the accused. Louisiana's statute for Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated, La. R.S. 14:98, is ambiguous as to whether the term "other means of conveyance" includes a non-motorized bicycle, and therefore does not apply to such conduct.
Facts:
- The Zachary Police Department received a report that a man had fallen from his bicycle on Highway 64.
- When an officer arrived, he observed John Carr riding a bicycle in the middle of a traffic lane and swerving from left to right.
- As the police unit approached, Carr lost control of the bicycle and fell onto the shoulder of the road.
- While helping Carr to his feet, the officer detected a strong odor of alcohol.
- Carr failed a horizontal gaze nystagmus test administered at the scene.
- After being transported to the police station, Carr submitted to an intoxilizer test, which indicated a blood alcohol level of .299.
Procedural Posture:
- John Carr was arrested and charged by bill of information in trial court with Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated, third offense.
- Carr filed a motion to quash the bill of information, arguing that the DWI statute does not apply to bicycles.
- The trial court granted Carr's motion to quash, dismissing the charge.
- The State of Louisiana, as appellant, appealed the trial court's decision to the First Circuit Court of Appeal.
- The First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, holding that a bicycle is an 'other means of conveyance' under the statute.
- The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted a writ application from the defendant, John Carr, to resolve a split among the state's appellate circuits on this issue.
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Issue:
Does the Louisiana statute for Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated, La. R.S. 14:98, which criminalizes the operation of 'any motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, vessel, or other means of conveyance' while intoxicated, apply to a person riding a bicycle?
Opinions:
Majority - Calogero, C.J.
No, the Louisiana statute for Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated does not apply to a person riding a bicycle. The statute is ambiguous, and under the well-established rule of lenity, criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. The statute's list of prohibited vehicles ends with the catch-all phrase 'other means of conveyance,' which is not defined. This ambiguity is compounded by a separate subsection of the statute, the 'Child Endangerment Law,' which refers to 'other means of motorized conveyance,' suggesting the legislature may have intended the entire statute to apply only to motorized transport. Furthermore, the legislative history is unclear as to whether the legislature intended to incorporate a prior highway act that explicitly covered bicycles when it created the current, broader DWI statute. Given these ambiguities, the law fails to provide fair warning that riding a bicycle while intoxicated is a criminal offense under this statute.
Concurring - Knoll, J.
I agree with the majority's conclusion that the statute is ambiguous. Further evidence of this ambiguity is found in the statute's penalty provisions, which allow offenders to receive suspended sentences if they participate in a 'driver improvement program.' This reference to a driver program strongly suggests the legislature intended the statute to apply to conveyances that require a driver's license, not bicycles.
Dissenting - Traylor, J.
Yes, the statute should apply to a person riding a bicycle. The legislature's intent is paramount, and a plain reading of 'other means of conveyance' is not limited to motorized vehicles. The legislative history clearly shows that when the current DWI statute was created, it repealed and was intended to consolidate two prior DWI schemes, one of which explicitly criminalized operating a bicycle while intoxicated on public highways. The legislature's specific use of 'motorized conveyance' in the separate Child Endangerment Law subsection indicates an intent to limit that specific provision, which implies that the main statute is broader and covers non-motorized conveyances. The court should not create ambiguity where none exists.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle of lenity in statutory interpretation, requiring that ambiguities in criminal laws be resolved in favor of the defendant. It demonstrates that even if conduct seems to fall within the spirit of a law, a lack of explicit statutory clarity can prevent prosecution. The ruling effectively carves out non-motorized vehicles like bicycles from the scope of Louisiana's primary DWI statute, highlighting a gap in the law. This places the burden on the legislature to amend the statute with specific language if it wishes to criminalize such behavior in the future.
