State v. Carlin
7 Kan. App. 2d 219, 640 p.2d 324, 1982 Kan. App. LEXIS 143 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to self-representation may be denied if the trial court finds the defendant is not competent to knowingly and intelligently waive their right to counsel. Separately, the attorney-client privilege does not protect physical evidence of a crime, and an attorney has a duty to turn over such evidence to the prosecution.
Facts:
- Bill Carlin was dissatisfied with how the Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) was processing his application for benefits.
- On January 4, 1980, Carlin called Michael VanLandingham, the director of SRS in Johnson County, Kansas.
- During the telephone conversation, Carlin made several threats against VanLandingham.
- Carlin recorded the phone conversation in which he made the threats.
- Carlin had a history of emotional disturbances and had previously been institutionalized for mental health problems.
- During court proceedings, Carlin made bizarre statements, referencing things such as the “Klong” and “ream power.”
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Bill Carlin in trial court with making a terroristic threat.
- During preliminary hearings, Carlin stated his desire to act as his own attorney.
- The trial court appointed a standby attorney to assist Carlin.
- The State filed a motion for a competency determination, which the trial court granted over Carlin's objection.
- The trial court found Carlin competent to stand trial.
- After further questioning, the trial court denied Carlin's request to represent himself and ordered the appointed attorney to conduct the defense.
- The trial court also ordered Carlin's attorney to turn over tape recordings to the State.
- A jury convicted Carlin of the charge.
- Carlin (appellant) appealed his conviction to the Kansas Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court erred in denying him the right to self-representation.
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Issue:
Does a trial court violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to self-representation by denying their request to proceed pro se when there is evidence that the defendant is not competent to knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel?
Opinions:
Majority - Meyer, J.
No. A trial court does not violate a defendant's right to self-representation by forcing counsel upon them when there is sufficient evidence to conclude the defendant is not competent to knowingly and intelligently waive their right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, established in Faretta v. California, is conditioned on the defendant's ability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. The trial court must ensure the defendant 'knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' While a defendant's technical legal knowledge is not relevant, their competency to make the waiver is. Here, Carlin's history of mental institutionalization and his bizarre in-court statements about 'Klong' and 'ream power' provided a sufficient basis for the trial court to conclude he was not competent to waive his right to counsel, despite being found competent to stand trial. Courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. The court also held there was no error in ordering the attorney to turn over the tape recordings. The tapes were not protected work product because they were not prepared in anticipation of litigation. Furthermore, an attorney has a duty to turn over physical evidence of a crime and cannot act as a 'depository for criminal evidence.' The attorney-client privilege protects communications, not physical evidence. In this case, since Carlin himself wanted the tapes turned over, any privilege related to the communication about the tapes was also waived.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies a significant limitation on the right to self-representation established in Faretta v. California. It distinguishes between competency to stand trial and the higher level of competency required to knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel. The ruling empowers trial judges to protect defendants from the consequences of their own mental instability by denying a pro se request, even when the defendant is articulate in their demand. This creates a protective buffer, prioritizing the fairness of the trial and the defendant's best interests over an absolute right to self-representation, particularly when mental health is a concern.
