State v. Brown
2020-Ohio-3614 (2020)
Rule of Law:
A statement is admissible as an excited utterance if it relates to a startling event and is made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement from that event, constituting an unreflective and sincere expression. Furthermore, a domestic violence conviction requires proof the defendant knowingly caused physical harm to a 'family or household member,' which broadly includes persons cohabiting and sharing familial/financial responsibilities and consortium, regardless of strict co-residence.
Facts:
- On December 16, 2017, Keaireus Fuqua was involved in a traffic accident on the north side of Lima, Ohio.
- An officer observed Fuqua with blood smeared around her mouth; she stated she was pregnant and exclaimed, "He never should have put his hands on me," later identifying Tayvon Brown, her romantic partner, as the cause of her injuries.
- Fuqua was taken to a hospital where she made further statements to medical staff and a detective, consistent with Brown having assaulted her, describing being thrown to the ground and punched.
- Police officers investigating the incident observed blood on the floor throughout Fuqua's apartment on Brower Road.
- Fuqua and Brown were in a sexual relationship and shared a child born in June 2018; Fuqua became pregnant with Brown's child around September 2017.
- Brown would typically provide Fuqua with money and help her out with expenses if she asked him, bought food and clothing for her and her son, and acted as a father figure to her son, though Fuqua denied they shared financial responsibilities or that she bought anything for him.
- Fuqua later testified in court that her initial statements to police and medical personnel about being assaulted by Brown were false and made out of anger, and that her nosebleed occurred when Brown pushed her face to get her off him during an argument.
Procedural Posture:
- On June 13, 2018, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Tayvon Brown on one count of domestic violence, a fifth-degree felony, specifically alleging he knew the victim, Keaireus Fuqua, was pregnant.
- On June 25, 2018, Brown appeared for arraignment and pleaded not guilty in the Allen County Court of Common Pleas (trial court).
- On December 13, 2018, the State filed a motion for the trial court to call Fuqua as the court’s witness, anticipating her trial testimony would contradict a prior statement to police.
- A jury trial commenced on December 17, 2018, where the trial court granted the State’s motion for Fuqua to be called as a court’s witness without objection.
- Brown twice moved for a judgment of acquittal under Crim.R. 29, which the trial court denied.
- On December 18, 2018, the jury found Brown guilty of domestic violence but found the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown knew Fuqua was pregnant, resulting in a conviction for first-degree misdemeanor domestic violence.
- The trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing, imposing 180 days in the Allen County Jail (80 days suspended), two years of community control/probation, and a $1000 fine, but did not award any jail-time credit.
- On January 2, 2019, Brown filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s December 19, 2018 judgment to the Court of Appeals, Third Appellate District (Appellant: Tayvon Brown, Appellee: State of Ohio).
- On September 3, 2019, the Court of Appeals dismissed Brown’s appeal for lack of a final, appealable order, noting the trial court failed to include a calculation of jail-time credit and remanding the case for a proper sentencing entry.
- On September 18, 2019, the trial court filed an amended judgment entry of conviction and sentence, stating Brown was given “no credit for time previously served prior to the sentencing date as the jail time imposed was a condition of community control.”
- On October 7, 2019, Brown filed a second notice of appeal from the trial court’s September 18, 2019 judgment to the Court of Appeals, Third Appellate District (Appellant: Tayvon Brown, Appellee: State of Ohio).
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Issue:
1. Does the admission of a domestic violence victim's out-of-court statements, made under the stress of a startling event and for medical diagnosis, constitute plain error or provide insufficient evidence for conviction when the victim later recants the statements in court, and was the victim a 'family or household member' as defined by Ohio law? 2. Did the trial court err by denying the defendant jail-time credit when his jail sentence for a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction was imposed as a separate sanction rather than a condition of community control?
Opinions:
Majority - Preston, J.
No, the trial court did not commit plain error by admitting the victim's out-of-court statements, and the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The court found Fuqua's initial statements to Patrolman Fried were admissible as excited utterances under Evid.R. 803(2). The assault was a startling event, and Fuqua remained under its stress, which was maintained or amplified by the subsequent car accident occurring while she pursued her assailant. Patrolman Fried's non-coercive questioning did not destroy the excitement. Fuqua's statements in medical records (State's Exhibit 15) and Norris's testimony regarding her symptoms and their cause were admissible under Evid.R. 803(6) (business records) and Evid.R. 803(4) (medical diagnosis/treatment). Any potential error in admitting the identification of Brown as the assailant in medical records was harmless because it was cumulative to the properly admitted excited utterances. Other minor hearsay from Norris and Detective Stechschulte was also deemed harmless given cumulative evidence or proper jury instructions. The court also determined that the evidence was sufficient to prove Fuqua was a 'family or household member' under R.C. 2919.25(F)(1). Despite not commingling assets or maintaining a shared residence, the evidence established 'cohabitation' through both consortium (sexual relationship, mutual child, friendship, respect, and mutual aid) and shared familial/financial responsibilities. Brown consistently provided financial assistance for Fuqua and her son's basic needs when asked and acted as a father figure to her son. The broad interpretation of 'cohabitation' under R.C. 2919.25 protects individuals based on the nature of their relationship. Furthermore, the jury did not clearly lose its way by discounting Fuqua's in-court recantation. The jury was fully aware of Fuqua's explanations for her prior statements (anger) and her attempts to retract her accusations. The jury, as the trier of fact, has appropriate discretion over witness credibility, and given Fuqua's multiple prior consistent statements to police and medical staff accusing Brown, along with photographic evidence of blood in the apartment, the jury was entitled to find her in-court recantation not credible. The court also rejected Brown's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding counsel was not deficient for failing to object to admissible evidence, and any failures were not prejudicial. However, Yes, the trial court erred by denying Brown jail-time credit. Both the State and Brown agreed that the jail sentence was imposed as a separate sanction, not a condition of community control. Therefore, Brown is entitled to jail-time credit under R.C. 2949.08(C)(1). The case was remanded to the trial court for the calculation and award of appropriate jail-time credit.
Analysis:
This case provides crucial clarity on the admissibility of victim statements in domestic violence cases, reinforcing the broad application of the excited utterance and medical diagnosis exceptions even when a victim later recants. It emphasizes that the definition of 'cohabitation' under Ohio's domestic violence statute is flexible, focusing on the quality and shared aspects of the relationship (familial, financial, and consortium) rather than strict co-residence or traditional financial arrangements. This broad interpretation ensures wider protection for victims. The decision also highlights appellate courts' deference to jury determinations of witness credibility, particularly when initial, consistent out-of-court statements are later contradicted in court. Finally, it serves as an important reminder to trial courts regarding the mandatory application of jail-time credit under R.C. 2949.08(C)(1) when jail time is a separate sanction.
