State v. Brown
272 Kan. 843, 2001 Kan. LEXIS 949, 35 P. 3d 910 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
Under Kansas law, an individual can be guilty of knowingly and intentionally receiving or accepting clearly excessive fees or expenses in connection with an adoption, even if the prohibited consideration has not been physically delivered, so long as a deal for the child's transfer based on such consideration has been brokered and the child transferred.
Facts:
- Susan K. Brown operated an escort service named "Blaze" out of her home in Wichita.
- Brown learned that Samantha Pruitt, a former employee, had given birth in Oklahoma and was considering putting the child up for adoption, so Brown told her to wait, then went to Oklahoma and brought Pruitt and her child to Brown's home.
- Brown arranged a deal for another employee, Teresa Lawrence, and Tina Black to acquire Pruitt's child in exchange for a new car, $800, and a cell phone.
- Brown was to receive half of the cash ($400) as compensation for her role in brokering the deal.
- The child was transferred from Pruitt to Lawrence and Black, but none of the agreed-upon compensation was paid or delivered to Pruitt or Brown.
- Pruitt became dissatisfied with the delay in payment and complained to a friend, who was the girlfriend of a police officer.
- During a monitored telephone call with police cooperation, Brown told Pruitt she would get "all that" (money, car, cell phone) when Pruitt produced the birth certificate, and confirmed Brown also had not yet received her half.
- It was stipulated that none of the promised money was intended for any bill or expense incidental to birth or adoption proceedings.
- Ultimately, the child was found and taken into protective custody.
Procedural Posture:
- Susan K. Brown was charged with one count of payment for adoption in violation of K.S.A. 59-2121(a) (felony) and one count of prohibited offers and placement of children for adoption in violation of K.S.A. 59-2123 (misdemeanor).
- Brown was convicted in a bench trial on stipulated facts in the district court (trial court) on both counts.
- Brown appealed her convictions to the Supreme Court of Kansas.
- On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas noted that the issue regarding the misdemeanor conviction (K.S.A. 59-2123) was not briefed and was therefore deemed abandoned, limiting their review to the felony conviction (K.S.A. 59-2121(a)).
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Issue:
Does knowingly and intentionally brokering a deal for the transfer of a child in exchange for prohibited consideration, where the child has been transferred and the consideration agreed upon but not yet physically delivered, constitute "receiving or accepting clearly excessive fees or expenses" in violation of K.S.A. 59-2121(c)?
Opinions:
Majority - McFarland, C.J.
Yes, knowingly and intentionally brokering such a deal constitutes "receiving or accepting clearly excessive fees or expenses" under the statute. The court emphasized that K.S.A. 59-2121(a) broadly prohibits any consideration in connection with an adoption or placement for adoption, except for specifically enumerated, reasonable expenses. K.S.A. 59-2121(c) criminalizes "knowingly and intentionally receiving or accepting clearly excessive fees or expenses in violation of subsection (a)." The court clarified that "clearly excessive fees or expenses" refers to any consideration that does not fall within the six statutory exceptions. The court distinguished between "receiving" and "accepting," concluding that the legislature's inclusion of "accepting" in subsection (c) indicated an intent to criminalize more than mere physical receipt of funds. By agreeing to the terms of the deal and facilitating the transfer of the child based on that agreement, Brown had "accepted" the prohibited consideration. The purpose of the statute, as evidenced by legislative comments and prior case law (State v. Clark), is to discourage the "marketing of children by limiting the profitability of such activity" and to address fees "of questionable legitimacy." The fact that law enforcement intervened before the money physically changed hands does not alter the nature of the transaction or the defendant's guilt, as the child had already changed hands pursuant to the brokered deal.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the interpretation of K.S.A. 59-2121, reinforcing the legislative intent to broadly prohibit the commercialization of adoption. It establishes that criminal liability for "receiving or accepting" excessive fees does not require physical possession of funds, but extends to brokering a deal where prohibited consideration is agreed upon and the child is transferred. The court's distinction between "receiving" and "accepting" provides a crucial interpretation for future cases, preventing individuals from escaping liability by claiming intervention occurred before funds were physically exchanged. This ruling strengthens protections against baby brokering by focusing on the underlying agreement and the transfer of the child rather than solely on the delivery of payment.
