State v. Brown
378 So. 2d 916 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
Criminal statutes cannot be extended by analogy or implication to create crimes not explicitly provided for by the legislature. Amending the general definition of 'person' to include a fetus does not implicitly amend the homicide statute, which criminalizes the killing of a 'human being,' to include feticide.
Facts:
- On May 25, 1977, Michael T. Brown and another individual killed Harriet St. Andre.
- At the time of her death, Harriet St. Andre was pregnant with a 'fertilized implanted fetus.'
- The act that killed St. Andre also caused the death of the fetus she was carrying.
- At the time, Louisiana's homicide statute, R.S. 14:29, defined homicide as 'the killing of a human being,' which courts had interpreted consistent with the common law rule requiring a live birth.
- In 1976, the Louisiana legislature had amended a general definitional statute, R.S. 14:2(7), to define 'person' to include 'a human being from the moment of fertilization and implantation.'
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Louisiana indicted Michael T. Brown for the second-degree murder of Harriet St. Andre and, in a separate indictment, for the murder of the fetus she was carrying.
- Brown was tried and convicted of manslaughter for the death of St. Andre.
- Brown then filed a motion to quash the indictment for the death of the fetus on double jeopardy grounds, which the trial court overruled.
- Following the denial of his motion, Brown pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the death of the fetus.
- The trial court denied Brown's request for an out-of-time appeal of this conviction.
- Brown sought a writ from the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which granted the writ and ordered an out-of-time appeal to be heard.
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Issue:
Does the killing of a fetus constitute the crime of homicide under Louisiana law, where the homicide statute defines the crime as the 'killing of a human being' and a separate statute defines 'person' to include 'a human being from the moment of fertilization and implantation'?
Opinions:
Majority - Dixon, Justice
No. The killing of a fetus does not constitute the crime of homicide under Louisiana law because the legislature has not expressly amended the homicide statute to include feticide. The homicide statute, R.S. 14:29, criminalizes the killing of a 'human being,' not a 'person.' Historically, 'human being' in the context of murder statutes has been interpreted to mean a person who has been born alive, a precedent established in State v. Gyles. While the legislature amended the definition of 'person' in R.S. 14:2(7), it did not amend the operative language of the homicide statute itself. Under the principle of strict construction (R.S. 14:3), criminal provisions cannot be extended by analogy to create crimes not explicitly defined. It is the legislature's role, not the court's, to expand the scope of homicide, and it must do so with clarity. Thus, an indictment charging the murder of a fetus does not charge a crime under current Louisiana law.
Dissenting - Marcus, Justice
Yes. The killing of a fetus should constitute homicide under the amended statute. The reasoning is straightforward: homicide is the killing of a 'human being,' and the newly amended R.S. 14:2(7) defines 'person' to include a 'human being from the moment of fertilization and implantation.' Therefore, a 'human being' for the purposes of the homicide statute logically includes a fetus, and the charge should be valid.
Dissenting - Blanche, Justice
Yes. The amendment to the definition of 'person' was a clear legislative response to this Court's prior decision in State v. Gyles, indicating an intent to provide criminal protection for the unborn. The definitions provided in R.S. 14:2 are intended to apply throughout the criminal code, including the homicide statute. The majority's reliance on Roe v. Wade is misplaced, as that case concerns a woman's privacy right to an abortion and does not prevent the state from prosecuting a third party for an unwanted assault that results in the death of a fetus.
Analysis:
This case strongly reinforces the principle of strict construction for criminal statutes, demanding legislative clarity and precision when defining criminal conduct. It establishes that courts will not create or expand crimes through implication or by connecting separate statutory amendments, placing the burden squarely on the legislature to expressly define new offenses. The decision required the Louisiana legislature, and serves as a guide for others, to pass specific feticide statutes if it wishes to criminalize the killing of a fetus, rather than relying on indirect changes to general definitions. This ruling underscores the separation of powers doctrine, affirming that defining crime is a legislative, not a judicial, function.
