State v. Brown
344 S.C. 70, 2001 S.C. LEXIS 43, 543 S.E.2d 552 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of a person's general character trait or disposition is inadmissible to prove conformity therewith, whereas evidence of a specific, particularized, and consistently repeated conduct is admissible as habit. The erroneous admission of inadmissible character evidence is considered harmless error if other properly admitted evidence proves the same character trait.
Facts:
- Shane Hammond (Victim) was living in the home of his granduncle, the appellant.
- The day before the killing, the appellant and Hammond argued over rent money.
- During the argument, eyewitnesses saw the appellant strike Hammond on the head multiple times with a blunt tool while holding a gun; Hammond was unarmed.
- The following day, Hammond returned to the house to retrieve his belongings.
- Appellant's wife, Erlene Brown, saw the appellant holding a billy club behind his back and warned him not to start anything.
- A physical fight began in the kitchen between the appellant and Hammond, during which the appellant hit Hammond with the billy club.
- As Mrs. Brown and her grandson fled the house, they heard two gunshots.
- The appellant shot Hammond twice, killing him.
Procedural Posture:
- The State prosecuted the appellant for murder in a South Carolina trial court.
- The appellant admitted to the killing but raised a claim of self-defense.
- Over the appellant's objection, the trial court admitted testimony regarding his general violent nature, his habit of carrying a gun, and his history of gambling.
- A jury found the appellant guilty of murder.
- The trial court sentenced the appellant to forty years in prison.
- The appellant appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, arguing the admission of the evidence was improper and prejudicial.
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Issue:
Does testimony describing a defendant’s general disposition to become violent constitute inadmissible character evidence under Rule 404, as distinguished from admissible habit evidence under Rule 406 which requires a specific, particularized pattern of conduct?
Opinions:
Majority - Moore, J.
Yes, testimony describing a defendant’s general disposition to become violent constitutes inadmissible character evidence. Such evidence is distinct from admissible habit evidence, which requires a specific, situation-specific pattern of conduct. The court reasoned that character evidence, defined as a 'generalized description of a person’s disposition,' is inadmissible under Rule 404(a) to prove a person acted in conformity with that trait. In contrast, habit evidence under Rule 406 is admissible because it concerns 'specific, particularized conduct capable of almost identical repetition.' Testimony that the appellant 'gets violent' when angry is a general statement about his character, not a description of a specific habit, and was therefore improperly admitted. However, the court found this to be harmless error because other properly admitted evidence—specifically, the appellant's unprovoked attack on the victim the previous day—already demonstrated his violent propensity. The court held that testimony about the appellant always carrying a gun was properly admitted as habit evidence because it described a specific, repeated behavior.
Analysis:
This case provides a clear judicial interpretation distinguishing between inadmissible character evidence under Rule 404 and admissible habit evidence under Rule 406. The court establishes that the key determinant is specificity; a general disposition is character, while a concrete, repeated action is habit. This decision reinforces the high bar for admitting evidence under the habit exception, preventing the prosecution from using vague claims about a defendant's temperament to prove guilt. Furthermore, the case serves as a strong example of the harmless error doctrine, demonstrating that even a clear evidentiary error at trial will not lead to a reversal if the appellate court believes the evidence was cumulative or its impact was minimal compared to the weight of properly admitted evidence.
