Yes, the judge made a mistake. To be guilty of this specific, very serious type of murder, the prosecution has to prove the person actually *knew* in their own mind that their actions were extremely dangerous. The court said that if Brown was drunk enough to black out, the jury should be allowed to consider whether he was even capable of knowing anything at that moment. This doesn't mean he gets off free—he could still be guilty of a less serious murder—but it means he might not be guilty of the absolute worst kind if he was too drunk to realize the risk.

No, the judge was right. Just saying 'I was drunk and don't remember' isn't a good enough excuse. Firing a shotgun at someone from a few feet away is obviously dangerous, and being drunk shouldn't change that. These judges worried that this new rule makes it too easy for drunk people to avoid being held responsible for the most serious crimes and that it makes the law confusing.

Yes, it was wrong. The court should have let the jury consider how drunk Jimmy was because it could show he didn't really understand how dangerous his actions were.

No, it wasn't wrong. The evidence showed that Jimmy knew what he was doing was dangerous. Just because he was drunk doesn't mean he didn't understand the risk.

Yes, the trial court erred. Evidence of intoxication is relevant to the formation of the specific mental state required for depraved mind murder and the jury must be allowed to consider it. New Mexico law distinguishes first-degree depraved mind murder from second-degree murder based on the required mental state. First-degree depraved mind murder requires proof that the defendant had 'subjective knowledge'—an actual awareness—that his act was extremely dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a 'wicked and malignant heart.' This is a heightened mens rea element. In contrast, second-degree murder requires only 'objective knowledge' of the risk, meaning a reasonable person would have known. Because extreme intoxication can prevent a person from forming the actual, subjective awareness of risk required for the first-degree offense, a defendant has a due process right to present evidence of intoxication to negate that specific element. The traditional specific-intent versus general-intent analysis is inapplicable here because 'subjective knowledge' is a unique, heightened mens rea that does not fit neatly into either category.

No, the trial court did not err. The evidence of intoxication offered by Brown was insufficient to warrant the requested jury instruction. Brown's testimony that he could not recall the incident does not equate to evidence that he lacked the capacity to form the required mental state at the time of the act. The act of firing a shotgun at close range into a group of people is so inherently dangerous that a jury could infer subjective knowledge from the act itself. The majority's holding creates an inconsistency with precedent, like State v. Campos, which holds that intoxication is not a defense to second-degree murder, and it risks requiring a more culpable mental state for depraved mind murder than for premeditated, willful murder.

Yes. The trial court erred because evidence of Brown's extreme intoxication was relevant to determining whether he possessed the 'subjective knowledge' required for depraved mind murder. I hold that a fact finder may consider evidence of extreme intoxication when determining whether a defendant possessed the requisite mental state of 'subjective knowledge' for first-degree depraved mind murder. This is because the 'subjective knowledge' element serves as proof that the defendant acted with a 'depraved mind' or 'wicked or malignant heart' and with utter disregard for human life. Intoxication may affect a person's capacity to subjectively realize that his or her act creates a very high degree of risk to the lives of others. Therefore, when the crime charged is depraved mind murder, evidence of intoxication may be taken into consideration by the jury when determining the existence of the required mens rea of 'subjective knowledge.' The trial court's refusal to give the requested instruction effectively denied Brown the right to present his theory of the case and constitutes reversible error.

No. The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on intoxication because the evidence offered at trial was not sufficient to support a jury determination that Brown, by reason of intoxication, did not have the subjective or actual knowledge required by the statute. Brown's testimony that he did not recall what happened due to excessive alcohol consumption is not sufficient to support an instruction that he lacked the requisite subjective knowledge. If Brown fired the shotgun intentionally, the jury was entitled to infer that he knew he created a high degree of risk to more than one person, regardless of his intoxication. There was no evidence that Brown's intoxication actually impaired his ability to know that his conduct was greatly dangerous to the lives of others. Allowing an intoxication instruction whenever there is evidence of heavy drinking goes too far in construing the statute that defines depraved mind murder.

State v. Brown

Case Podcast

Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

Gunnerbot