State v. Brouwer
2001 S.C. App. LEXIS 108, 346 S.C. 375, 550 S.E.2d 915 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
A trial court impermissibly penalizes a defendant for exercising the constitutional right to a jury trial by imposing a harsher sentence than a co-defendant who pled guilty, when the court's justification centers on the rehabilitative benefits of admitting guilt. A court's mere disavowal of intent to punish a defendant for demanding a trial is insufficient to cure the constitutional error.
Facts:
- In early February 1999, the Cherokee County Metro Narcotics Unit began an undercover investigation of Bedtyme Stories, an adult business.
- On February 18, Officer David Parker rented a videotape titled 'AGB2 (ANAL GANG BANGERS 2)' from a sales clerk, Wendy Kaplan.
- On February 22, Officer Parker returned to the store to purchase a copy of the same movie from another clerk, Eric Brouwer.
- During the sale, Brouwer handled the videotape's box, which featured sexually explicit photographs and the full title in multiple places.
- Brouwer accessed Parker's customer account, discussed the movie with him, and completed the sale.
- Brouwer required Parker to sign a receipt certifying that he was at least twenty-one years old before giving him the bag with the video.
Procedural Posture:
- Eric Brouwer and Wendy Kaplan were indicted by a Cherokee County grand jury for disseminating obscene material.
- Kaplan, the co-defendant, pled guilty before their scheduled joint trial.
- The trial court sentenced Kaplan to two years plus a fine, suspended upon payment of a smaller fine, with two years probation.
- Brouwer (defendant) proceeded to a jury trial in the trial court.
- The jury returned a guilty verdict.
- The trial court sentenced Brouwer to four years, suspended upon service of six months, and three years probation.
- Brouwer (appellant) appealed his conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeals of South Carolina (intermediate appellate court).
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Issue:
Does a trial court improperly punish a defendant for exercising their right to a jury trial when it imposes a harsher sentence than that of a co-defendant who pled guilty, and explicitly states that admitting guilt is a 'first step towards rehabilitation' and a reason for the co-defendant's leniency?
Opinions:
Majority - Shuler, J.
Yes. A trial court improperly punishes a defendant for exercising their right to a jury trial under these circumstances. The trial judge's comments, which explained the sentencing disparity by emphasizing that the co-defendant's guilty plea was a 'first step towards rehabilitation,' are indistinguishable from those found to be unconstitutional in the precedent case, Davis v. State. The court found that these statements clearly revealed the trial judge improperly considered Brouwer's decision to proceed with a jury trial when determining the sentence. Even though the judge stated he would not punish Brouwer for going to trial, the commentary's taint remains, especially without another appropriate basis in the record for the disparate sentence.
Dissenting - Anderson, J.
No. The trial court did not improperly punish the defendant but rather permissibly extended leniency to the co-defendant for pleading guilty. It is a constitutionally permissible practice to reward a defendant who admits guilt, which aids in rehabilitation and conserves state resources, without it being considered a penalty for another defendant who proceeds to trial. The judge explicitly stated he was not punishing Brouwer for exercising his right, and his comments were a valid explanation for the co-defendant's more lenient sentence, not a rationale for Brouwer's harsher one. The majority's holding places a 'judicial strait jacket' on a judge's ability to articulate the valid reasons for sentencing decisions.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the strict prohibition against penalizing a defendant for exercising their Sixth Amendment right to a trial. It serves as a strong caution to trial judges that their sentencing rationale must be carefully articulated to avoid any language that could be interpreted as penalizing a defendant who proceeds to trial. The case highlights that even if a judge's subjective intent is proper, objective statements on the record that unfavorably compare a defendant who had a trial to one who pled guilty can lead to a sentence being overturned, thereby protecting the integrity of the right to a jury trial.
