State v. Brooks
658 A.2d 22 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
A seller of real property who consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death by failing to disclose a known, undiscoverable, and life-threatening defect can be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter if that reckless omission causes the death of the buyer.
Facts:
- In May 1986, Defendant purchased a home equipped with a gas-powered driveway heater located in the garage.
- On November 27, 1987, the heater malfunctioned, releasing noxious fumes that sickened an occupant, Jill McDermott, and her infant. They were treated at a hospital.
- A plumber, Ben Linden, and a gas company (VGS) employee inspected the heater, found a dislodged flap preventing proper exhaust, and told Defendant it was dangerous and should not be used until repaired. McDermott relayed to Defendant that the VGS employee said the fumes were carbon monoxide and she was 'lucky to be alive.'
- One month later, Linden saw the heater was still unrepaired and warned Defendant he was playing 'Russian roulette.'
- In May 1988, Defendant listed the house for sale. He did not tell his agent about the heater's history but instructed the agent to run it only briefly for demonstrations.
- In August 1988, Defendant asked a carpenter, Karl Sklar, to work on the heater because it had 'problems,' but Sklar declined.
- Defendant sold the home to the Cifarelli family. During showings and a professional inspection, Defendant demonstrated the heater but did not disclose its dangerous, unrepaired condition. At the closing, he advised the Cifarellis not to run it for more than two hours.
- On December 9, 1988, the Cifarelli family used the driveway heater, resulting in the deaths of John and Linda Cifarelli and their four-year-old daughter from carbon monoxide poisoning.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant was charged in a Vermont trial court with three counts of involuntary manslaughter by reckless endangerment.
- Following a trial, a jury returned a guilty verdict in October 1992.
- Defendant filed a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied.
- Defendant appealed his conviction and the denial of his motion to the Supreme Court of Vermont.
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Issue:
Does a home seller's failure to disclose a known, life-threatening defect in a home heating system, which subsequently causes the buyers' deaths from carbon monoxide poisoning, constitute a reckless act sufficient to support a conviction for involuntary manslaughter?
Opinions:
Majority - Allen, C.J.
Yes. A home seller's failure to disclose a known, life-threatening defect constitutes a reckless act sufficient to support a conviction for involuntary manslaughter. The court found that the State presented sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the Defendant acted with the requisite recklessness. The court endorsed the Model Penal Code's definition of recklessness, which requires a 'conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk.' Evidence showed Defendant was repeatedly warned of the heater's lethal danger, knew it was unrepaired, yet failed to disclose this defect to the buyers. This failure to act, where there was a pre-existing legal duty for a seller to disclose known material defects, constituted a reckless omission. The court also held that the potential negligence of third parties (like the gas company or home inspector) was not an unforeseeable intervening cause that would break the chain of causation, as the deaths were a natural result of the Defendant's reckless act.
Analysis:
This case is significant for establishing that the breach of a civil duty, such as a real estate vendor's duty to disclose known material defects, can serve as the basis for a criminal conviction for involuntary manslaughter. It expands the scope of criminal liability for omissions, particularly in the context of commercial transactions involving inherently dangerous conditions. The decision reinforces that the mental state of 'recklessness' requires a subjective, conscious disregard of a known risk, distinguishing it from the lower standard of criminal negligence. This precedent informs prosecutors on how to charge individuals whose non-physical acts or failures to act lead to fatal consequences.
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