State v. Brockway
330 Or. App. 640 (2024)
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Rule of Law:
A trial court abuses its discretion by denying a criminal defendant a continuance to investigate new, potentially bias-revealing information about a key witness, disclosed by the state on the morning of trial, especially when the witness's credibility is central to the case.
Facts:
- Shawn Mitchell Brockway resides on a rural property with his elderly mother and serves as her caretaker.
- Brockway discovered an individual identified as F sleeping in an outbuilding on the property.
- Brockway called 9-1-1 to report the trespass and took action to remove F from the outbuilding.
- According to the state, Brockway yelled at F, shined a flashlight in his eyes, sprayed mace or pepper spray at F’s face, physically removed him, sprayed him again, and threw a metal object at F’s head.
- According to Brockway, he only yelled at F to get out, called 9-1-1 multiple times, never entered the outbuilding, never had physical contact with F, never sprayed anything, and threw a plastic milk crate and a flashlight at F.
- F walked down the hill where he met the police, who subsequently arrested him for trespassing.
- Brockway was charged with harassment.
Procedural Posture:
- Shawn Mitchell Brockway was convicted of harassment (ORS 166.065(3)) in the Clackamas County Circuit Court.
- Shawn Mitchell Brockway, as the defendant-appellant, appealed this judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon.
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Issue:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion by denying a criminal defendant a request for a continuance to investigate information provided by the state on the morning of trial, regarding a key witness's potential bias stemming from a pre-charge criminal referral, when the witness denies knowledge of such referral?
Opinions:
Majority - Aoyagi, P. J.
Yes, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Shawn Mitchell Brockway's request for at least a short continuance. The state disclosed to defense counsel on the morning of trial that the district attorney's office had a pre-charge referral for F, the complaining witness, for fourth-degree assault. This information was highly relevant to F's potential bias, as F would have a motive to curry favor with the state by testifying favorably, a principle recognized in cases like State v. Nacoste and State v. Valle. The trial court's reasons for denying the continuance—that it was only a referral and F denied knowledge—were legally unsound. The desire to avoid a criminal charge is a powerful motivator for bias, and F's denial made investigation, not immediate cross-examination, necessary to ascertain the truth and potentially impeach F under OEC 609-1(2). Denying any opportunity to investigate such late-produced, potentially materially beneficial information, especially when F's credibility was central to the case and there was no other bias evidence, was outside the range of legally permissible outcomes. The court cited Ferraro and Kindler for similar findings of abuse of discretion in cases of unpreparedness due to circumstances beyond counsel's control. The denial prejudiced Brockway because the trial was largely a credibility contest between F and Brockway.
Concurring in part, dissenting in part - Joyce, J.
No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a continuance. Appellate courts are historically hesitant to second-guess trial courts' denials of continuances, reviewing only for abuse of discretion. The trial court appropriately addressed the prosecutor's disclosure by holding an OEC 104 hearing where F testified under oath that he had no knowledge of the potential charge and no negotiations with the state. The trial court considered these denials, the speculative nature of the pre-charge referral, the opportunity for defense counsel to question F about the possible charge, and the potential inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence. These factors are appropriate for a trial court to balance when managing its docket and the interests of all parties, as discussed in State v. Powell. The majority's reliance on Kindler, Ferraro, and Hickey is distinguishable because those cases involved defendants who were prevented from adequately preparing a significant part of their defense due to factors like insufficient time to prepare for complex felony charges or loss of an entire case file. In contrast, this case was nearly a year old, involved misdemeanors, and defense counsel had sufficient time to prepare, with F's potential bias not being the primary theory of the defense. The trial court allowed Brockway to question F about the potential bias. The trial court's decision was within the range of legally permissible outcomes.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the bounds of judicial discretion regarding continuances, especially concerning late-breaking discovery of potential witness bias. It establishes that a pre-charge referral for a key witness is highly material and that a defendant's right to investigate such information, particularly when the witness denies knowledge, outweighs the interest in expeditious trial scheduling. The ruling emphasizes that the lack of any opportunity to investigate such crucial, late-disclosed information constitutes an abuse of discretion, particularly when a witness's credibility is paramount. This may lead to stricter scrutiny of last-minute disclosures by the state and could compel trial courts to grant continuances more readily under similar circumstances to ensure a fair trial and the defendant's right to present an adequate defense.
