State v. Bowman
656 S.E.2d 638, 188 N.C.App. 635, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 281 (2008)
Rule of Law:
A defendant charged with aiding and abetting statutory rape must have subjective knowledge of the victim's age, as accomplice liability requires a criminal state of mind, and victim impact testimony from prior bad acts is inadmissible during the guilt phase of a trial.
Facts:
- On February 18, 2005, Stephanie B., age fourteen, and Rachelle D., age fifteen, lied to their mothers for permission to spend the night with Rachelle’s boyfriend, Christopher Hall, age twenty-four, and Timothy Cutshaw, age eighteen.
- Rachelle’s mother drove Stephanie and Rachelle to the mall where they met Christopher Bowman, Cutshaw, and Hall.
- Christopher Bowman drove the group to a store where Hall purchased alcohol, and then drove them to Christopher Bowman’s home.
- At Christopher Bowman’s home, the group watched a movie in the living room and drank the purchased alcohol, later consuming some of Christopher Bowman’s alcohol from the kitchen.
- Stephanie and Cutshaw subsequently went into a bedroom and had sexual intercourse, while Rachelle and Hall went into another bedroom and also had intercourse.
- Christopher Hall testified that Rachelle had previously called him to meet at the mall, and he called Christopher Bowman for a ride, who initially refused but changed his mind after Rachelle called to ask for a ride.
- Christopher Hall admitted to being sexually involved with Rachelle on several prior occasions, including some at Christopher Bowman's home.
- Detective James Marsh testified that Christopher Bowman stated during his interview that he did not know the victims’ ages and thought both girls were over the age of eighteen.
Procedural Posture:
- Christopher Bowman was charged with four counts of aiding and abetting statutory rape, four counts of taking indecent liberties with a child, and two counts of second-degree kidnapping.
- On January 27, 2006, a jury returned a verdict finding Christopher Bowman guilty of three counts of aiding and abetting statutory rape, three counts of taking indecent liberties with a child, and two counts of second-degree kidnapping.
- Christopher Bowman was sentenced to eight consecutive sentences of imprisonment, totaling lengthy terms.
- Christopher Bowman appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina.
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Issue:
1. Does aiding and abetting statutory rape require the defendant to have subjective knowledge of the victim's age, necessitating a jury instruction on this knowledge element? 2. Is victim impact testimony from prior bad acts admissible during the guilt phase of a trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Calabria, Judge
Yes, aiding and abetting statutory rape requires the defendant to have subjective knowledge of the victim's age, and no, victim impact testimony from prior bad acts is not admissible during the guilt phase of a trial. The trial court erred by denying Christopher Bowman's request for a jury instruction requiring knowledge of the victims' ages for aiding and abetting statutory rape. While statutory rape is a strict liability crime for the principal, aiding and abetting requires a mens rea, specifically that the accomplice has knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose to commit a crime and the intent to facilitate that purpose (citing State v. Goode). Since there was evidence, including Christopher Bowman's own statement, suggesting he believed the girls were over eighteen, a mistake of fact instruction was warranted. Failure to give this instruction, when supported by evidence and a correct statement of law, is an error of constitutional dimension, presumptively prejudicial, warranting a new trial. The trial court also erred in admitting victim impact testimony from victims of Christopher Bowman’s prior crimes during the guilt phase of the trial. Victim impact testimony, which describes the emotional consequences of a crime, is only admissible during the sentencing phase because it has little probative value during the guilt phase and its inflammatory nature can unduly prejudice the jury (citing State v. Nicholson and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-833). This error was prejudicial, creating a reasonable possibility of a different result had it not occurred, thereby entitling Christopher Bowman to a new trial. However, the trial court did not err in admitting Daniel's testimony about Christopher Bowman's prior sexual misconduct under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b), because the incidents were sufficiently similar (likeness in age of victims, sexually related nature) and temporally proximate (despite a time gap, explained by incarceration and relocation, indicating a continuing plan), making the evidence more probative than prejudicial under Rule 403. While the trial court erred in admitting certified copies of Christopher Bowman's prior sexual battery convictions as 'bare convictions' after extensive testimony on their underlying facts (per State v. Wilkerson), this error did not constitute plain error because Christopher Bowman failed to object at trial, and given the volume of properly admitted testimony, it did not tilt the scales towards a different verdict. Finally, the trial court did not commit plain error by not defining 'unlawfully' in the second-degree kidnapping instruction. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39, defining kidnapping, does not require the principal to know the victim is under sixteen or removed without parental consent; rather, the victim's age is a factor related to the State's burden of proof regarding consent, not an essential element of the crime itself (citing State v. Hunter).
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the mens rea requirement for accomplice liability in North Carolina, establishing that aiding and abetting statutory rape is not a strict liability offense and requires the defendant's subjective knowledge of the victim's age. This prevents prosecutors from securing convictions based solely on the principal's strict liability. It further reinforces the strict limitations on victim impact testimony, ensuring it is confined to the sentencing phase to prevent undue prejudice during the determination of guilt. The decision also provides a nuanced application of Rule 404(b) for admitting prior bad acts, emphasizing the importance of similarity and temporal proximity while reiterating the 'bare convictions' rule from Wilkerson and distinguishing it from non-plain error when extensive underlying facts are already in evidence.
