State v. Bowers
87 So. 3d 704, 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 136, 2012 WL 572972 (2012)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The fellow officer rule does not create an exception to the hearsay rule, and therefore does not permit an officer lacking firsthand knowledge of a traffic stop to testify as to what the stopping officer told them for the purpose of establishing the validity of that stop in a suppression hearing.
Facts:
- An officer, Officer Suskovich, conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle driven by Michelle Bowers.
- After the stop was completed, a second officer, Officer Tracy, was called to the scene.
- Officer Tracy, who did not observe Bowers' driving or the initial stop, conducted a DUI investigation based on information he received from Officer Suskovich.
- Officer Tracy's understanding of why Bowers was stopped was based solely on what Officer Suskovich told him.
- Following the investigation by Officer Tracy, Bowers was arrested for DUI and possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia.
Procedural Posture:
- Michelle Bowers was charged with misdemeanor offenses in county court.
- Bowers filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing the initial traffic stop was illegal.
- At the suppression hearing, the stopping officer did not appear, and the State presented testimony from the arresting officer, who had not witnessed the stop.
- The county court granted Bowers' motion to suppress.
- The State appealed to the circuit court, which acted as an intermediate appellate court.
- The circuit court reversed the suppression order, relying on the case of Ferrer v. State.
- Bowers, as petitioner, sought second-tier certiorari review from the Second District Court of Appeal.
- The Second District Court of Appeal granted the petition, quashed the circuit court's decision, and certified conflict with the Fourth District's decision in Ferrer.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the fellow officer rule allow an officer, who did not witness the initial traffic stop, to testify about what the stopping officer told them in order to prove the stop was legally valid at a suppression hearing?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. The fellow officer rule does not allow hearsay testimony from a non-witness officer to be used to establish the validity of another officer's traffic stop. The fellow officer rule is a mechanism that allows officers to rely on their collective knowledge to act in the field, such as making an arrest based on information from another officer. It is not a rule of evidence and does not create an exception to the rule against hearsay. When testimony is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted—that a traffic violation occurred—it is inadmissible hearsay. The rule allows an officer to justify their own conduct based on information received, but not to testify about facts known only to another officer to justify that other officer's conduct, especially when the testifying officer learned the information 'after the fact.'
Dissenting - Lewis, J.
The dissent does not address the merits of the fellow officer rule issue. Instead, it argues that the Second District Court of Appeal improperly exercised its jurisdiction by granting second-tier certiorari review merely because it disagreed with a precedent from another district court. The dissent contends that the majority should have first addressed this jurisdictional defect and dismissed the case on those grounds rather than reaching the substantive legal question.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies and limits the scope of the fellow officer rule in Florida, distinguishing its proper use in the field from its improper use in the courtroom. By holding that the rule is not a hearsay exception, the court strengthens defendants' rights at suppression hearings. The ruling ensures that the State cannot prove the legality of a traffic stop through a surrogate witness; it must produce the officer with personal knowledge of the events, thereby allowing for meaningful cross-examination about the basis for the stop. This prevents the State from insulating a potentially illegal stop from challenge simply because the stopping officer is unavailable to testify.
