No. The court said that having a lawyer who used to prosecute you isn't an automatic 'get out of jail free' card. Bowen argued that this situation was a 'structural error'—a mistake so big that the whole trial is considered unfair from the start. The court disagreed, explaining that such an automatic reversal is only for very specific situations, like when a lawyer tries to represent two competing clients at the same time. Bowen's case was different because the conflict was from the past. For this type of old conflict, Bowen needed to show exactly how his lawyer's past job caused him to do a poor job in the current case. Since Bowen's only argument was that it was an automatic error, and he couldn't point to any actual mistakes his lawyer made, his claim failed.

No, the judge didn't make big enough mistakes to change the outcome. (1) Bowen said it was okay for that first lawyer to represent him, so he can't complain now. (2) The judge carefully considered letting the jury hear about Bowen's past crimes and decided it was more helpful than harmful. (3) Helping with a crime isn't a separate way of committing rape, so the jury didn't need to all agree on how Bowen helped. (4) Even though answering the jury's question in writing without Bowen there was wrong, it didn't make a difference in the end. Bowen's guilty verdict stays, but the part of his sentence saying he can't contact certain people is thrown out.

We review whether the probative value of otherwise relevant evidence outweighs its potential for undue prejudice for abuse of discretion.

A district court abuses its discretion when:(1) no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the judge;(2) a ruling is based on an error of law; or (3) substantial competent evidence does not support a finding of fact on which the exercise of discretion is based.

When a district court communicates with a jury outside of a defendant's presence, we evaluate the impact of the error by considering:(1) the strength of the prosecution's case;(2) whether an objection was lodged;(3) whether the communication concerned a critical aspect of the trial; and (4) the ability of a posttrial remedy to mitigate the error.

A court's consideration of the admissibility of evidence requires the application of statutory rules controlling the admission and exclusion of certain types of evidence, which are applied as a matter of law or as an exercise of the trial court's discretion, depending on the applicable rule.

An appellate court exercises de novo review of a challenge to the adequacy of the legal basis of a district judge's decision on admission or exclusion of evidence.

—set out various factors for courts to consider when balancing the probative value of propensity evidence in sex offense cases against its potential for prejudice: " `1) how clearly the prior act has been proved; 2) how probative the evidence is of the material fact it is admitted to prove; 3) how seriously disputed the material fact is; and 4) whether the government can avail …

Consequently, this court reviews the underlying factual findings for support by substantial competent evidence and the legal conclusions de novo.

Generally, constitutional grounds for reversal asserted for the first time on appeal are not properly before an appellate court for review.

It is inappropriate to combine a no-contact order with a prison sentence because to do so exceeds a sentencing court's authority under KSA 2014 Supp. 21-6604 (a).

"Relevant evidence is both:(1) material, ie, the fact has a legitimate and effective bearing on the decision of the case and is in dispute; and (2) probative, ie, it has any tendency in reason to prove the fact."

No. The attorney's conflict of interest, based on his prior role as a prosecutor against Bowen, does not constitute structural error requiring automatic reversal. A defendant in a successive representation conflict must show that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance to establish a Sixth Amendment violation. The court reasoned that Bowen’s claim of structural error fails as a matter of law because automatic reversal for a conflict of interest is reserved for specific circumstances not present here, namely multiple concurrent representations where the trial court fails to inquire after a timely objection. The court distinguished Bowen's situation as one of successive representation, which falls under a different analysis requiring a showing of adverse effect or prejudice under the frameworks of *Cuyler v. Sullivan* or *Strickland v. Washington*. Since Bowen exclusively argued for automatic reversal and did not demonstrate how the alleged conflict specifically impaired his counsel's performance at the preliminary hearing, his claim is without merit.

No. (1) Bowen's conflict of interest claim fails because he validly waived any conflict with his preliminary hearing counsel on the record. (2) The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior crimes evidence to show propensity after weighing the probative value against the risk of undue prejudice. (3) Aiding and abetting is not an alternative means of committing rape, so no unanimity instruction on the aiding and abetting factors was required. (4) While answering the jury's question in writing outside Bowen's presence violated his right to be present, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Bowen's convictions are affirmed, but the illegal no-contact order portion of his sentence is vacated.

State v. Bowen

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