State v. Bonner
330 N.C. 536, 1992 N.C. LEXIS 2, 411 S.E.2d 598 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
The felony murder rule does not apply to hold co-felons criminally liable for murder when their accomplices are killed by an adversary, such as a victim or police officer, resisting the commission of the underlying felony, as the killing is not committed by the defendant or someone acting in concert with them in furtherance of the criminal enterprise.
Facts:
- Defendants, Gregory Gainey, and El’Ricko Stewart planned to rob the Steamboat Restaurant in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
- Around 9:00 p.m. on May 29, 1990, Stewart and Gainey, armed and dressed in black, entered the front of the Steamboat Restaurant.
- Sergeant Dallas Pruitt, an off-duty police officer working as the restaurant’s security guard, was seated near the main cash register.
- Stewart entered, saw Sergeant Pruitt, and shot him in the chest, then a second time in the arm.
- Despite serious injury, Pruitt returned fire, fatally shooting Stewart.
- Gregory Gainey then approached Pruitt, who fired two more shots, fatally wounding Gainey.
- While Pruitt defended the main entrance, defendants went to the west or 'take-out' entrance, took $334.38, and fled.
- Autopsy reports revealed that Stewart and Gainey died as a result of gunshots fired by Sergeant Pruitt.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendants were indicted on two counts of first-degree murder and other charges.
- Each defendant filed a motion to dismiss the murder charges, alleging that the felony murder rule was inapplicable.
- The trial court (Superior Court, Forsyth County) denied these motions.
- Defendants subsequently pled guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and the underlying felony of armed robbery, one count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, one count of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and several additional counts of armed robbery.
- The trial court consolidated the two counts of first-degree murder for judgment, sentencing each defendant to life imprisonment, and arrested judgment on the underlying armed robbery charges.
- Each defendant then filed a motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty to the two counts of first-degree murder.
- The trial court denied these motions.
- Each defendant appealed the denial of their motions to withdraw their pleas.
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Issue:
Does the felony murder rule apply to hold co-felons criminally liable for first-degree murder when their accomplices are killed by an adversary resisting the commission of the underlying felony?
Opinions:
Majority - WHICHARD, Justice
No, the common law theory of felony murder will not be extended to cover situations where co-felons are killed by an adversary during the commission of a felony. The court reaffirmed its longstanding precedent from State v. Oxendine, which established that criminal responsibility for a homicide requires that the act of killing be committed by the defendant or someone acting in concert with them in furtherance of a common design or purpose. In this case, Sergeant Pruitt was an adversary to the defendants and their accomplices, and his actions were in direct opposition to the criminal scheme, not in furtherance of it. Pruitt was not an agent of the defendants. The court noted that this “agency theory” of felony murder is the prevailing view in the overwhelming majority of states and that expanding the rule to include deaths caused by adversaries would lead to absurd results, as illustrated by prior cases and hypotheticals. Furthermore, the court emphasized that such a significant expansion of criminal liability should originate from the legislature and apply prospectively, not retroactively through judicial action, to avoid potential due process violations.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces North Carolina's adherence to the “agency theory” of felony murder, clarifying that a defendant can only be held liable for murder if the fatal act was committed by them or an accomplice acting in furtherance of the felony. It explicitly rejects the “proximate cause theory” which attributes all deaths proximately caused by the felony to the felons, regardless of who inflicted the fatal blow. The decision serves as a strong precedent limiting felony murder liability and emphasizes judicial restraint, deferring substantial expansions of criminal law to the legislative branch. It provides critical guidance for legal practitioners and students regarding the scope of criminal responsibility in complex felony murder scenarios.
