State v. Bonfanti
227 So.2d 916, 254 La. 877, 1969 La. LEXIS 3340 (1969)
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Rule of Law:
The 'foreseeable that human life might be endangered' element of Louisiana's aggravated arson statute requires that the danger be to persons present at or in close proximity to the site when the fire is started. The statute does not encompass the potential danger to firefighters who are called to extinguish the blaze after it has commenced.
Facts:
- Steve Bonfanti, Jr. set fire to a structure located at 2302 Highland Road in Baton Rouge.
- At the time of the fire, the structure was an unoccupied building.
- No other buildings were endangered by the fire.
- The only individuals whose lives were potentially endangered by the act were the firefighters of the Baton Rouge Fire Department who would be called to extinguish the fire.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Louisiana charged Steve Bonfanti, Jr. by indictment in a Louisiana trial court with the crime of aggravated arson.
- In response to the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars, the state stipulated that the only endangered human lives were those of potential responding firefighters.
- Based on the state's response, the trial court granted Bonfanti's motion to quash the indictment and dismissed the prosecution.
- The State of Louisiana, as appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
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Issue:
Does the potential danger to firefighters who respond to a blaze satisfy the element of aggravated arson that it be 'foreseeable that human life might be endangered,' when the fire is set to an unoccupied building with no other structures or persons nearby?
Opinions:
Majority - Hamiter, Justice
No. The potential danger to firefighters arriving after a fire has been set to an unoccupied building does not satisfy the 'foreseeable danger to human life' element of the aggravated arson statute. The court reasoned that the legislative history of arson statutes demonstrates an intent to protect individuals who are present at or near the scene at the time the fire is set. To interpret the statute as the state suggests—that foreseeing a response from the fire department is sufficient—would effectively eliminate the distinction between aggravated arson and simple arson (LRS 14:52), as it is foreseeable in almost every case of intentional burning that firefighters will be called and their lives endangered. The legislature, having enacted both statutes simultaneously, could not have intended for one to render the other inoperative. The purpose of the aggravated arson statute is to cover situations where danger is foreseeable at the commencement of the fire due to the close proximity of persons to the object being burned.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of Louisiana's aggravated arson statute by creating a bright-line temporal rule. It establishes that the foreseeability of endangerment must be assessed based on the circumstances existing at the moment the fire is set, not on the predictable consequences of the subsequent emergency response. This prevents prosecutors from escalating charges from simple to aggravated arson based solely on the inherent risks faced by first responders. The ruling solidifies the distinction between the two degrees of arson, ensuring the lesser offense remains a viable charge for fires set to unoccupied property where no civilians are in immediate danger.
