State v. Bolsinger
699 P.2d. 1214, 1985 Utah LEXIS 798 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
For a conviction of second-degree murder based on 'depraved indifference to human life,' the state must prove the defendant knew their conduct or the surrounding circumstances created a grave risk of death, and the conduct must qualitatively evidence extreme inhumanity, wickedness, or wantonness beyond mere recklessness.
Facts:
- On March 29, 1980, Kaysie Sorensen, 33, was found dead by her boyfriend, Mark Anger, in his apartment, with a clock radio cord loosely tied around her neck.
- Sorensen had a blood alcohol level of .22 and had a history of drinking problems and difficulty achieving sexual gratification; she and Anger had explored explicit sexual practices.
- On the evening of March 28, 1980, Sorensen, intoxicated, met the 23-year-old defendant, Bolsinger, at Bill's Lounge, danced with him, and left with him shortly before 10:00 p.m.
- Bolsinger and Sorensen drove to Anger's apartment, where they played records, danced, drank whiskey, and engaged in sexual intercourse.
- During intercourse, Bolsinger pulled a clock radio cord around Sorensen's neck, after which she died; Bolsinger then covered her, scattered contents of her purse, and left with Anger's stereo.
- In an initial confession, Bolsinger stated he grabbed the radio and wrapped the cord around Sorensen's neck after she 'got kinda weirdlike,' and he 'just started pullin' on it' for what 'seemed like a second,' denying anger or a fight.
- At trial, Bolsinger testified that Sorensen picked up the radio, placed the cord around her own neck, and asked him to 'pull' while they resumed intercourse, and he pulled 'like tying your shoes' for 15-20 seconds before climaxing.
- The medical examiner testified that death was caused by strangulation, with light ligature marks, no signs of struggle, and that unconsciousness would occur in 5-10 seconds, with death in 30 seconds to 2.5 minutes, hastened by intoxication and Bolsinger's weight.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant Bolsinger was arrested and subsequently made a confession to police officers.
- Bolsinger was charged with murder in the second degree.
- Bolsinger filed a motion in the trial court to suppress his confession, arguing that his Miranda rights were violated.
- The trial court conducted a two-day hearing on Bolsinger's motion and denied it, finding the confession to have been voluntary.
- A jury found Bolsinger guilty of murder in the second degree.
- Bolsinger appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Utah.
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Issue:
Was there sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of second-degree murder under a 'depraved indifference to human life' theory, and did the trial court err in admitting the defendant's confession despite alleged Miranda violations?
Opinions:
Majority - Howe, Justice
No, there was insufficient evidence to convict Bolsinger of second-degree murder based on depraved indifference to human life, but the trial court did not err in admitting his confession. The court found that Bolsinger's confession was voluntarily made, initiated by him after a substantial break in police contact (from 6:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m.), thus distinguishing his situation from cases like Edwards v. Arizona where police re-initiated interrogation. Regarding the second-degree murder charge, the court concluded that the State failed to prove the requisite 'knowing' mental state for depraved indifference. While Bolsinger's conduct (pulling a cord around the victim's neck) created a grave risk of death, the evidence did not demonstrate that he knew his actions or the compounding circumstances (like the victim's intoxication) were 'reasonably certain to cause the result' of death. His statements consistently denied intent to harm, and the physical evidence (light ligature marks, no struggle) supported the idea of momentary pressure rather than sustained, deliberate force. The court determined that Bolsinger's actions, though resulting in death, amounted to recklessness (conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk) rather than 'depraved indifference to human life,' which requires a higher degree of unmitigated wickedness, extreme inhumanity, or wantonness, akin to a specific intent to kill. The circumstances of consensual intercourse with a sexually sophisticated, intoxicated woman, and the light physical evidence, did not meet this high standard. Therefore, the conviction for second-degree murder was set aside, and the case was remanded for entry of a conviction for manslaughter, which the jury's verdict necessarily encompassed.
Dissenting - Hall, Chief Justice
Yes, there was sufficient evidence to convict Bolsinger of second-degree murder. The majority opinion improperly substitutes the Court's judgment for that of the jury on factual issues, which is contrary to the standard of appellate review requiring evidence to be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. The jury heard conflicting accounts from Bolsinger—his initial written statement suggesting an intentional act (he grabbed the cord and pulled after she 'got kinda weirdlike') and his later trial testimony blaming the victim. The jury, as the fact-finder, was entitled to accept the initial confession as truth and disregard the later, inconsistent trial testimony, especially given Bolsinger's admitted lies. The medical examiner's testimony that strangulation was the cause of death, that it's impossible for a person to strangle themselves to death, and that pressure for at least 30 seconds was required, combined with evidence from the scene, fully supports the jury's finding of an intentional killing and therefore second-degree murder. The differences in medical expert opinions were for the jury to weigh, and they were properly instructed on this.
Concurring and dissenting - Stewart, Justice
Yes, I concur that the second-degree murder conviction should be set aside due to insufficient evidence of the requisite mental state. However, I dissent from the majority's decision to remand for a judgment of conviction for manslaughter. This action violates the defendant's right to trial by jury and the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, as the defendant did not seek such a reduction, and the jury did not make a specific finding on the mental state for manslaughter. Furthermore, I dissent from the majority's conclusion that Bolsinger's Miranda rights were not violated. The police engaged in illegal conduct by repeatedly questioning and pressuring Bolsinger to confess after he had invoked his right to counsel multiple times. This included threats of first-degree murder charges, graphic descriptions of execution, deprivation of food, and placement in a harsh jail environment, all designed to psychologically coerce a confession. The police initiated renewed contact by leaving a card and an open invitation to talk, effectively manipulating Bolsinger into 'initiating' the later communication. This prolonged psychological duress vitiated any supposed waiver of rights, meaning the confession should have been suppressed, and the case should either be retried without the confession or, given the lack of evidence for second-degree murder, result in an acquittal. This reluctant concurrence in disposition is due to the lack of a majority for either a discharge or a new trial.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the high bar for proving 'depraved indifference to human life' for second-degree murder in Utah, distinguishing it from mere recklessness. It emphasizes that both a 'knowing' mental state (awareness of a grave risk of death) and a qualitative evaluation of the conduct (evidencing extreme wickedness) are required. The case also highlights the stringent standards for validating a defendant's waiver of Miranda rights after they have invoked the right to counsel, particularly in the face of sustained psychological pressure from law enforcement. The split among the justices regarding the disposition underscores the complexities of appellate review when evidence is deemed insufficient for the charged crime but potentially sufficient for a lesser included offense, especially concerning double jeopardy protections.
