State v. Bolsinger
2006 WL 305536, 2006 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 18, 709 N.W.2d 560 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
For the purpose of sexual abuse statutes requiring an act be 'by force or against the will' of a person, consent is not vitiated by fraud in the inducement, which involves deception as to a collateral matter like the perpetrator's purpose. Consent is only vitiated by fraud in fact, which involves deception as to the essential nature of the physical act itself.
Facts:
- John Michael Bolsinger was the program supervisor at the Wittenmyer Youth Center, a state facility for delinquent boys.
- Bolsinger would take individual boys into a private room, telling them he was performing a medical check for bruises, hernias, or testicular cancer.
- After stating this purpose, Bolsinger would touch the boys' genitals with his hands.
- The boys testified they were aware of and consented to the specific act of hand-to-genital contact.
- The boys also testified that they would not have consented had they known Bolsinger's true, non-medical reason for the touching.
- Testimony indicated that the highly structured environment of the facility made it nearly impossible for the boys to refuse a request from an instructor.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Iowa charged John Michael Bolsinger in a state trial court with third-degree sexual abuse and other offenses.
- Bolsinger filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his home, which the trial court denied.
- At trial, the jury was instructed that an act is 'against the will' if consent is procured by deception.
- A jury in the trial court convicted Bolsinger on all counts.
- Bolsinger, as appellant, appealed his convictions to the Iowa Court of Appeals.
- The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Supreme Court of Iowa granted further review of the case.
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Issue:
Does consent to a physical act, procured by deception as to the perpetrator's purpose but not as to the nature of the physical act itself, render the act 'against the will' of the person for a conviction of third-degree sexual abuse under Iowa Code section 709.4(1)?
Opinions:
Majority - Larson, Justice.
No. Consent to a physical act is legally valid for the purposes of the third-degree sexual abuse statute even if procured by deception as to the perpetrator's purpose, because such deception constitutes fraud in the inducement, not fraud in fact. The court distinguished between fraud in fact (deception as to the nature of the act itself), which vitiates consent, and fraud in the inducement (deception as to a collateral matter like motive), which does not. In this case, the boys consented to the specific physical act of hand-to-genital contact; the deception related only to Bolsinger's collateral purpose for the contact. Because the victims were 'touched in exactly the manner represented to them,' the deception was fraud in the inducement, and their consent was not legally vitiated. Therefore, the act was not 'against the will' of the victims as required for a conviction under Iowa Code § 709.4(1), and the conviction for third-degree sexual abuse must be reversed. The court explicitly overruled a prior case, State v. Vander Esch, which had held similar facts constituted fraud in fact.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the distinction between fraud in fact and fraud in the inducement within Iowa's sexual abuse jurisprudence, narrowing the scope of what constitutes an act 'against the will' of a victim. By holding that deception as to motive alone does not negate consent, the ruling makes it more difficult to prosecute sexual abuse cases where a perpetrator in a position of authority uses deceit, rather than physical force, to obtain consent for a specific physical act. The case sets a precedent requiring prosecutors to prove that the victim was deceived about the physical nature of the act performed, not just the perpetrator's underlying intentions. This raises the evidentiary bar in cases involving abuse of trust where the touching itself was ostensibly permitted by the victim.
