State v. Boleyn
328 So. 2d 95 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of a defendant's unconscious state due to voluntary intoxication is admissible in a prosecution for the general intent crime of escape if it is offered to show that the defendant did not voluntarily commit the act of departing, but was instead physically removed from custody by another person.
Facts:
- Michael Wayne Boleyn was a maintenance inmate at the Camp Beauregard Work Release Center.
- Boleyn alleged that he was sexually assaulted by another inmate the night before the incident.
- On the day of the alleged escape, February 19, 1975, Boleyn consumed a substantial quantity of beer and took 'toanol' (Tuinal) pills.
- Boleyn stated that he felt unwell, went to sit in a truck, and his next memory was of being in the back of his brother's car while another inmate, A. C. Manuel, was driving.
- Boleyn claimed he then took over driving from Manuel, who was also intoxicated.
- At approximately 2:30 p.m., Boleyn and Manuel were discovered missing from the work release center.
- Less than twelve hours later, state troopers stopped Boleyn and Manuel for a traffic violation near Lake Charles, with Boleyn driving.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Louisiana charged Michael Wayne Boleyn by bill of information with the crime of simple escape.
- Boleyn was tried before a jury.
- At trial, the judge heard testimony regarding Boleyn's state of consciousness, intoxication, and an alleged prior sexual assault outside the presence of the jury.
- The trial judge ruled this evidence inadmissible and excluded it from the jury's consideration.
- The jury found Boleyn guilty as charged.
- Boleyn appealed his conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the highest court in the state for this matter.
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit reversible error by excluding evidence that a defendant, charged with the general intent crime of simple escape, was unconscious due to voluntary intoxication when that evidence is offered to support the defense that he was physically removed from custody by another person without his knowledge or consent?
Opinions:
Majority - Calogero, J.
Yes. The trial court committed reversible error. While voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a general intent crime like simple escape, the proffered evidence was not merely to show intoxication. The defense's theory was that Boleyn was in an unconscious state and was physically removed from the facility by another inmate without his knowledge or consent. Evidence supporting this theory is relevant to whether the defendant voluntarily performed the act of departing from custody, which is a necessary component of even general criminal intent. The evidence of Boleyn's state of consciousness and intoxicated condition should have been submitted to the jury, accompanied by a careful instruction that voluntary intoxication alone is not a defense.
Dissenting - Marcus, J.
No. The trial court did not err. A person who voluntarily becomes intoxicated is legally responsible for all criminal consequences of their condition, unless the crime requires specific intent. The crime of escape requires only general intent. Therefore, Boleyn's criminal intent is found in his initial intention to become intoxicated, and the act of escape is a consequence of that voluntary intoxication for which he should be held responsible.
Analysis:
This case creates a narrow but significant exception to the well-established rule that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general intent crimes. It distinguishes between using intoxication to negate intent (which is impermissible for general intent crimes) and using evidence of an unconscious state caused by intoxication to negate the voluntariness of the criminal act itself. The decision emphasizes that even for a general intent crime, the state must prove the defendant committed a voluntary act. This ruling provides a pathway for defendants to introduce evidence of extreme intoxication, but only when coupled with a plausible claim that another party acted upon them while they were unconscious, effectively turning the defense from one of mental state to one of physical action.
