State v. Black
627 So. 2d 741, 1993 WL 492509 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
To convict for simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, the prosecution must prove unauthorized entry, that the structure was inhabited at the time of entry, and specific intent to commit a felony or theft; additionally, sentencing judges considering habitual offender status must rely on recognized, relevant aggravating circumstances, not a defendant's post-conviction denial of guilt, to justify an upward departure from sentencing guidelines.
Facts:
- During the early morning hours of October 2, 1992, Anna Mae Richardson's barking dogs drew her attention to a neighboring home at 7226 Liberty Street, Shreveport, Louisiana.
- Richardson observed three men lurking around a shed in the backyard of the home; they crouched down when an oncoming automobile shined its lights on them, and two of them left carrying an unidentified object.
- Richardson, who was a personal acquaintance of Sandra Law (the tenant renting 7226 Liberty Street and in the process of moving out), telephoned Law, who informed Richardson that no one was supposed to be in the house, and Richardson then called the Shreveport Police Department.
- Upon returning from making calls, Richardson saw the lights on in the kitchen at 7226 Liberty Street, and a black man, later identified as Lee Cizer Black, removing curtains from the kitchen window.
- Shortly after police arrived, they found Lee Cizer Black lying on the floor in a back bedroom, acting as if he were asleep.
- Sandra Law testified that she did not give Black permission to enter her house or remove anything, and that property was missing from the house; she also stated that all utilities were still connected, some of her belongings were still in the house, and she intended to return the day after the incident, indicating she still considered it her place of abode despite moving out.
Procedural Posture:
- Lee Cizer Black was arrested and charged with simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling.
- A jury convicted Black as charged.
- Black filed a motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal, claiming insufficient evidence, which the trial court denied.
- After a sentencing hearing, Black was found guilty of being a second felony offender and sentenced to eight years at hard labor.
- Black filed a Motion to Reconsider the sentence imposed as excessive, which the trial court denied.
- Black appealed to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit, complaining that the trial court erred in denying the Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal and the Motion to Reconsider Sentence.
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Issue:
1. Does the evidence presented at trial sufficiently prove beyond a reasonable doubt all essential elements of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, specifically unauthorized entry, inhabitation, and intent to commit a felony or theft? 2. Did the trial court err in departing upward from the Felony Sentencing Guidelines for a second felony offender based on improper aggravating circumstances?
Opinions:
Majority - Victory, J.
Yes, the evidence presented at trial sufficiently proved all essential elements of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling beyond a reasonable doubt. The court applied the `Jackson v. Virginia` standard, requiring a rational trier of fact to find essential elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The unauthorized entry element was satisfied by Sandra Law's unequivocal testimony that she did not give Lee Cizer Black permission to enter or remove items. The intent element was satisfied because specific intent can be inferred from circumstances; Richardson saw Black removing curtains from the kitchen, and Law reported missing property, making it reasonable to infer Black intended to steal when he entered. The court rejected Black's hypothesis of innocence (seeking refuge and sleep) as not sufficiently reasonable given the direct evidence of him removing curtains and missing property, distinguishing it from prior cases. The inhabitation element was met because the house was still considered Law's place of abode; although she was moving, she still had custody and control, utilities were connected, belongings remained, and she intended to return, satisfying the requirement that someone was 'living' there, even if not physically present at the time. Therefore, the conviction is affirmed. No, the trial court erred in departing upward from the Felony Sentencing Guidelines because the aggravating circumstances cited were improper. While sentencing guidelines are advisory, judges must consider them and state reasons for departure, specifying relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court's upward departure from the recommended six-year sentence for a second offender burglar was based on Black's continued denial of guilt after conviction and an unsupported claim that he lied about a prior felony conviction. The court held that a defendant has a constitutional right to deny guilt after conviction and should not be punished for exercising that right. Furthermore, there was no record support for the contention that Black lied about his prior felony. Since neither of these reasons constituted relevant aggravating circumstances under the guidelines, the upward departure was unjustified. The sentence is vacated and remanded for resentencing. Additionally, the trial court failed to give Black credit for time served, which is an error patent that must be corrected upon resentencing.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the high bar for appellate review of evidentiary sufficiency under the `Jackson v. Virginia` standard, particularly in proving specific intent through circumstantial evidence in burglary cases. It clarifies that a dwelling can retain its 'inhabited' status for burglary purposes even when the resident is actively moving out, emphasizing the occupant's intent and continued control over the premises. Crucially, the decision limits judicial discretion in sentencing by holding that a defendant's exercise of their constitutional right to deny guilt post-conviction cannot serve as an aggravating factor for an enhanced sentence, and that other aggravating factors must be relevant and factually supported by the record. This ensures that sentencing departures are based on legally sound principles rather than subjective judicial disapproval of a defendant's demeanor or post-conviction statements.
